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双方不完全信息下政府引导的逆向供应链协调研究
引用本文:贡文伟,葛翠翠.双方不完全信息下政府引导的逆向供应链协调研究[J].工业工程与管理,2012(4):1-7,30.
作者姓名:贡文伟  葛翠翠
作者单位:江苏大学管理学院
基金项目:国家社会科学基金青年项目(10CGL025);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(10YJA630043);江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学基金项目(2011SJB630007);江苏大学高级专业人才科研启动基金项目(11JDG005)
摘    要:讨论双方不完全信息下政府引导一个制造商和两个零售商组成的逆向供应链的协调问题。运用信号甄别和委托代理理论,分别从政府不参与、政府奖励零售商和政府奖励制造商三个方面得到零售商和制造商的协调策略。研究表明:定价合同可有效避免逆向选择,实现逆向供应链协调;高市场需求状态下低成本零售商获得收益较高;政府对企业的合理奖励,尤其是对零售商的奖励,可以促进逆向供应链协调,提高收益。

关 键 词:逆向供应链  协调  不完全信息  政府引导

Study on the Coordinating with Incomplete Information of Both Sides and Government Guidance in Reverse Supply Chain
GONG Wen-wei,GE Cui-cui.Study on the Coordinating with Incomplete Information of Both Sides and Government Guidance in Reverse Supply Chain[J].Industrial Engineering and Management,2012(4):1-7,30.
Authors:GONG Wen-wei  GE Cui-cui
Affiliation:(School of Administration,Jiangsu University,Zhenjiang 212013,China)
Abstract:In this paper,we discusses the coordinating problem of a reverse supply chain consisted of one manufacturer and two retailers with incomplete information of both sides and government guidance.We use signal screening and principal-agent theory to get coordinated strategies from three aspects of government does not participate in the chain,government incentives retailers and government incentives manufacturers.The studies show that:the contract pricing can be effective to avoid adverse selection,to achieve the reverse supply chain coordination;retailer of low cost and with high market demand to obtain higher profit;the reasonable reward enterprise,especially rewards for retailers can promote reverse supply chain coordination,and increase profitability.
Keywords:reverse supply chain  coordination  incomplete information  government guidance
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