| 不完全信息下的最终报价仲裁 |
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| 引用本文： | 郭文革.不完全信息下的最终报价仲裁[J].控制与决策,1995,10(1):40-44,79. |
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| 作者姓名： | 郭文革 |
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| 作者单位： | 华中理工大学系统工程研究所 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金,博士点基金 |
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| 摘 要： | 基于争议双地仲裁人的裁决值有不同的概率估计，而这些估计是双方共同知识这一前提分析最终报价中仲裁，把它构造成一个不完全信息的非零和对策模型。然后给出了局部、全局Ｎａｓｈ平衡报价策略存在唯一的充分条件，最后探讨了双方认识存在的差异对争议人报价行为的影响。
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| 关 键 词： | 冲突分析 仲裁 协商 对策 最终报价仲裁 |
Final-offer Arbitration under Incomplete Information |
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| Guo Wenge, Chen Ting.Final-offer Arbitration under Incomplete Information[J].Control and Decision,1995,10(1):40-44,79. |
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| Authors: | Guo Wenge Chen Ting |
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| Affiliation: | Huazhong University of Science and Technology |
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| Abstract: | In recent years, final-offer arbitration has become an increasingly frequent means of resolving labor disputes in the private and public sectors. In the present paper, final-offer arbitration under incomplete information is modelled as a kind of non-zero-sum games. Existence and uniqueness conditions of the disputants' equilibrium offer strategies are given. and the effect of difference of the disputants' estimates to their offers is examed. |
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| Keywords: | conflict analysis arbitration bargaining incomplete information non-cooperative games |
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