利他偏好下低碳供应链批发价格契约协调机制

以政府碳排放限额与交易为背景，将决策主体的利他偏好引入到低碳化供应链模型中，分别建立了完全自利下、利他偏好下基于批发价格契约的报童模型，探讨了利他偏好对低碳供应链相关决策及其协调性的影响。通过建立模型和数值分析发现：零售商更倾向于与低碳型制造商合作，零售商的利他偏好能在一定程度上鼓励制造商投资减排，因而制造商更倾向于与利他偏好型零售商合作。在制造商面临碳减排压力下，零售商更应承担起整个供应链的效用责任，除了考虑自身效用外，还需考虑制造商的效用，其利他性应高于制造商，进而推动供应链系统效用的提升。但在批发价格契约下，无论零售商和制造商是否具有利他偏好行为，均不能改变传统供应链的协调性，即不能实现供应链的协调。

Low-carbon supply chain coordination considering altruism under contract of wholesale price

In the context of government’s carbon emissions cap and trade, this paper introduces the altruism behavior into the model of low-carbonization supply chain, and establishes completely selfish preference and altruistic preference newsboy models based on the wholesale price contract, in order to investigate the influence of the altruistic preferences for the decisions and coordination of the low-carbon supply chain. Some important conclusions are found through the establishment of model and numerical analysis： the retailer is more willing to cooperate with the low carbon manufacturer, and the retailer’s altruistic preferences can encourage the manufacturer to invest carbon emission reduction, so the manufacturer is more willing to cooperate with the altruistic preference retailer； under the manufacturer’s pressure of carbon emission reduction, the retailer should take on the whole supply chain, not only considering his own utility, but also considering the utility of the manufacturer, and the retailer altruism should be higher than the manufacturer’s, and thus promote the supply chain system utility. However, under the wholesale price contract, whether the retailer and the manufacturer have altruistic preferences, they can’t change the coordination of the traditional supply chain, that is, the coordination of supply chain can’t be achieved.