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Study on Game Theory of Social Law Enforcement
作者姓名:张国臣  黎志成
作者单位:ManagementCollege,HuazhongUniversityofScienceandTechnology,Wuhan,Hubei430074,China
摘    要:Based on the basis of the two-stage dynamic game of complete information and purely tactful perfect equilibrium theory, the non-cooperative gaming between the police department and the criminals is analyzed. Dy-namic game can be proved to forecast and explain potential tactful choices of the police department and the crimi-nals at various stages, so as to analyze the essence of the law enforcement by the theoretical models.

关 键 词:法律实施  博弈论  Nash平衡  Bayesian平衡  贝氏平衡  动态策略  冲突法
收稿时间:2003/5/29 0:00:00

Study on Game Theory of Social Law Enforcement
ZHANG Guo chen and LI Zhi cheng.Study on Game Theory of Social Law Enforcement[J].Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology,2003,12(3):329-331.
Authors:ZHANG Guo chen and LI Zhi cheng
Affiliation:Management College, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, Hubei 430074, China
Abstract:Based on the basis of the two stage dynamic game of complete information and purely tactful perfect equilibrium theory, the non cooperative gaming between the police department and the criminals is analyzed. Dynamic game can be proved to forecast and explain potential tactful choices of the police department and the criminals at various stages, so as to analyze the essence of the law enforcement by the theoretical models.
Keywords:law enforcement  dynamic game  Nash equilibrium  Bayesian equilibrium
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