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基于债务的机会网络"物-物交换"激励机制
引用本文:姚建盛,马春光,袁琪.基于债务的机会网络"物-物交换"激励机制[J].北京邮电大学学报,2016,39(4):103-107.
作者姓名:姚建盛  马春光  袁琪
作者单位:哈尔滨工程大学 计算机科学与技术学院, 哈尔滨150001;吉林师范大学 计算机学院,吉林 四平136000;哈尔滨工程大学 计算机科学与技术学院,哈尔滨,150001
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目(61472097),高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金资助课题(博导类)(20132304110017),黑龙江省自然科学基金项目(F201229)
摘    要:针对机会网络简单"物-物交换"(SBT)激励机制降低网络性能的问题,设计了一种基于债务的"物-物交换"(DBT)激励机制.DBT通过引入债务关系改变了SBT中严格的等价交换原则,增加了单次交易的转发数据量,从而提高了网络性能.为使债务关系可靠运行,设计了基于信任的惩罚机制和基于债务的缓存策略.仿真实验证明,和SBT相比,DBT在有效激励节点协作的同时提高了网络性能.

关 键 词:机会网络  自私  "物-物交换"激励机制  债务

A Debt-Based Barter Trade Incentive Mechanism in Opportunistic Networks
YAO Jian-sheng,MA Chun-guang,QUAN Qi.A Debt-Based Barter Trade Incentive Mechanism in Opportunistic Networks[J].Journal of Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications,2016,39(4):103-107.
Authors:YAO Jian-sheng  MA Chun-guang  QUAN Qi
Abstract:In order to solve the problem that existing simple barter trade ( SBT) incentive mechanisms in opportunistic networks degrade the network performance, a debt-based barter trade ( DBT ) incentive mechanism was proposed. The DBT changes the rigid equivalent barter trade principal in SBT by introdu-cing debt relationship, which increases the number of forwarding data in a single trade and then improves the network performance. A trust-based punishment scheme and a debt-based caching strategy was de-signed to guarantee that debt relationship credibly run. Simulations show that DBT can obtain better net-work performance than SBT and effectively motivate nodes' cooperations.
Keywords:opportunistic networks  selfishness  barter trade incentive mechanisms  debt
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