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国有企业委托代理问题探析
引用本文:苏相锟.国有企业委托代理问题探析[J].中共长春市委党校学报,2003(4):24-26.
作者姓名:苏相锟
作者单位:中共吉林省委党校经济学教研部,吉林长春1300l2
摘    要:公有制为主体的所有制结构,决定了我国国有企业的委托代理关系较西方国家的企业有很大的特殊性,即委托代理链条过长、所有缺位、企业干部行政化、激励机制失效和约束机制弱化等。因此,完善国有企业委托代理关系必须创新委托代理机制,精简委托代理链条;取消行政干部任命制,引入市场竞争机制;改革企业分配制度,建立有效的激励约束机制。通过改革和创新,降低代理成本,提高代理效率。

关 键 词:国有企业  委托代理  所有制结构  公有制经济  市场竞争机制  企业分配制度  激励约束机制  代理效率  产权理论  公司控制权
文章编号:1008-8466(2003)04-0024-03
修稿时间:2003年4月20日

Exploration of Problem of Entrusting Agent of State-owned Enterprises
SU Xiang-kun.Exploration of Problem of Entrusting Agent of State-owned Enterprises[J].Journal of Changchun Communist Party Institute,2003(4):24-26.
Authors:SU Xiang-kun
Abstract:Ownership structutre with public ownership as the main body decides that our entrusting agent relationship of state-owned enterprises has big particularity compared with the enterprises in the western countries,that is,the chain of entrusting agent is too long;the owner is absent;enterprise cadres are administrationalized;encouraging mechanism is not effective and control mechanism weakens,etc.Therefore,to perfect the entrusting agent relationship,we must innovate the mechanism of entrusting agent,simplify the chain,abolish appointment of administrative cadres,introduce mechanism of market competition,reform distribution system in enterprises,establish effective mechanism of encouragement and control so that we can reduce the entrusting cost and raise efficiency through reform and innovation.
Keywords:state-owned enterprises  entrusting agent  innovation
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