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调整利益分配关系,遏制地方政府的土地违法违规行为
引用本文:汪东升.调整利益分配关系,遏制地方政府的土地违法违规行为[J].行政与法,2013(11):14-19.
作者姓名:汪东升
作者单位:中共开封市委党校,河南开封475001
基金项目:国家社科基金项目“地方政府农地非农化失范问题及其制度规制研究”的阶段性成果,项目编号:11BFX064.
摘    要:经济激励机制是地方政府土地违法违规行为产生的重要原因之一,通过调整利益分配关系,能够弱化经济激励机制,遏制地方政府的土地违法违规行为.利益分配关系的调整包括三个方面:一是对不同级别地方政府的土地收益进行调整;二是对失地农民、国家及边远地区农民三者之间的土地收益进行调整和规范;三是以事权和财权相匹配为基础,对中央政府和地方政府的财政收入份额进行调整,以增加地方政府的财政收入,弱化其对“土地财政”的依赖.

关 键 词:地方政府  利益分配  土地  违法违规

Adjust Relations of Assigning Profit and Stem Delinquent Behavior on the Local Government Lands
Wang Dongsheng.Adjust Relations of Assigning Profit and Stem Delinquent Behavior on the Local Government Lands[J].Public Administration & Law,2013(11):14-19.
Authors:Wang Dongsheng
Affiliation:Wang Dongsheng
Abstract:For the delinquent behavior on local government lands,one of a most important reason for its generation is economical impelling.This article gives the expounding that through adjusting relations of assigning profit and weakening this impelling we can get restrains for it.The relations of assigning profit contain three ways:first is adjust the profit for different periods of local governments;second is adjust and regulate the profit between landless peasants,remote area peasants and the nation;last is based on matching administrative power and financial power,we can adjust the central and local governments" financial quotient to increase the local governments" financial revenue and weaken its dependence on "land finance".
Keywords:local governments  assign profit  lands  delinquent behavior
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