Administrative Review in a System of Conflicting Values

An issue of continuing debate in the legal and social science literature is how best to control and validate the exercise of essentially legislative powers by administrative agencies. This study examines one mechanism of control, administrative de novo review of agency decisionmaking. It explores how this device functions in immigration bail administration, a system where there is a broad and vague delegation of detention and bail powers to government oficials in an area of law where there is no set of preferences as to how conflicting policy claims are to be weighed in decisionmaking. The study shows a system in turmoil. The de novo review body–the immigration court-frequently and substantially modifies the Immigration Service's initial bail decisions. Because there is no agreement on the norms to guide decisionmaking, these changes have little effect on ongoing agency activity and policies. Pronounced interagency conflict and extreme decisional disparity persist given limited institutional and political arrangements for dealing with this dissensus. The study explores in detail the institutional cultures and conflicting legal and social values that shape the practice and patterns of de novo review in this field of law and discusses the implications of such conflict for the full functioning of this external review device.