The enduring centrality of individual ministerial responsibility within the British constitution

Despite concerns regarding its practical utility the convention of individual ministerial responsibility remains central to any analysis of the British constitution. The convention forms the ‘buckle’ in the relationship between parliament and the executive. It is widely acknowledged that throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the executive has gained the ascendancy in this relationship. Consequently, the enduring centrality of the convention rests not in its use by parliament as a tool with which to scrutinise the executive but, conversely, as a tool used by the executive to dismiss reform proposals that threaten its dominant position. This article reviews the way in which British government developed and particularly how this evolution gave primacy to a convention that contained mutually supportive yet contradictory strands. It then demonstrates the core argument of this article by examining two case studies ‐the introduction of freedom of information legislation and the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights. The article concludes by considering the wider implications of the continuing centrality of ministerial responsibility and the paradoxes and challenges it presents.