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新《环境保护法》对重污染企业盈余管理的影响研究——基于政治成本假说的实证检验
引用本文:黄溶冰,周卉芬.新《环境保护法》对重污染企业盈余管理的影响研究——基于政治成本假说的实证检验[J].中国环境管理,2021,13(2):63-71.
作者姓名:黄溶冰  周卉芬
作者单位:浙江工商大学会计学院, 浙江杭州 310018
基金项目:国家社会科学基金重点项目“领导干部自然资源资产离任审计推动绿色发展的政策效果与政策优化研究”(21AZD061)。
摘    要:本文利用新《环境保护法》实施这一外生事件,采用双重差分模型,从应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理两个方面实证检验了政治成本对重污染企业盈余管理的影响。研究发现在新《环境保护法》实施后,相比于非污染企业,重污染企业面临更高的政治成本,其进行了显著的向上应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理,向外界传递了企业未来发展良好的信息。上述研究结论经过一系列稳健性检验依然成立。进一步的异质性检验表明:①基于产权性质的分析表明,本文的研究结论在非国有企业的子样本组中更为明显;②基于企业规模的分析表明,小规模重污染企业更倾向于进行向上应计盈余管理,但不同规模重污染企业的真实盈余管理没有显著差异;③基于市场竞争程度的分析表明,高市场竞争环境下的重污染企业更倾向于采取向上应计盈余管理,低市场竞争环境下的重污染企业更倾向于进行向上真实盈余管理;④基于经济发展水平的分析表明,东部地区的重污染企业倾向于向上应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理。本文研究结论与西方的“政治成本假说”并不相符,为中国情境下的“政治成本理论”发展提供了另一种证据,同时为进一步加强新《环境保护法》的环境规制效果提供了决策参考。

关 键 词:新《环境保护法》  政治成本  盈余管理  双重差分模型

The Impact of the Revised Environmental Protection Law on Earnings Management of Heavy Polluting Enterprises-An Empirical Test Based on the Political Cost Hypothesis
HUANG Rongbing,ZHOU Huifen.The Impact of the Revised Environmental Protection Law on Earnings Management of Heavy Polluting Enterprises-An Empirical Test Based on the Political Cost Hypothesis[J].Chinese Journal of Environmental Management,2021,13(2):63-71.
Authors:HUANG Rongbing  ZHOU Huifen
Affiliation:School of Accounting, Zhejiang Gongshang University, Hangzhou 310018, China
Abstract:This paper used the revised Environmental Protection Law to implement this exogenous event,using a difference-indifferences model,from two aspects of accrual earnings management and real earnings management to empirically test the influence of political cost on earnings management behavior of heavy polluting enterprises.It was found that after the implementation of the revised Environmental Protection Law,heavy polluting enterprises face higher political costs than non-polluting enterprises,and carry out significant upward accrual earnings management and real earnings management,passing on the information of the future development of the enterprise to the outside world.Through a series of robustness tests,the conclusion remained unchanged.Furthermore,the heterogeneity testing showed that:①Based on the analysis of property rights,the conclusion of this paper was more obvious in the sub-sample group of non-state-owned enterprises.②The analysis based on the scale of enterprises showed that smallscale heavy polluting enterprises preferred to carry out upward earnings management behavior,but there was no significant difference in the real earnings management behavior of different-scale heavy polluting enterprises.③The analysis based on the degree of market competition showed that the enterprises with heavy pollution in the high market competition environment preferred to adopt the upward accrual earnings management;Under the environment of low market competition,enterprises with heavy pollution tended to carry out upward real earnings management.④The analysis based on the level of economic development showed that heavy polluting enterprises in the east tended to adopt the upward accrual earnings management and the real earnings management.The conclusion of this paper was not consistent with the Western“political cost hypothesis”,which provided another evidence for the development of“political cost theory”in China,at the same time,it provided decision-making reference for further strengthening the environmental regulation effect of the New Environmental Protection Law.
Keywords:the revised Environmental Protection Law  political costs  earnings management  difference-in-differences model
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