| 基于博弈模型的东道国利用外资均衡分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 何谦.基于博弈模型的东道国利用外资均衡分析[J].西安电子科技大学学报(社会科学版),2007,17(6):80-85. |
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| 作者姓名： | 何谦 |
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| 作者单位： | 西北大学,经济管理学院,陕西,西安,710118 |
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| 摘 要： | 针对东道国与外资间的利益博弈,构造了满足投资需求的博弈分析理论模型。基于完全信息静态假设条件,论证了东道国利用外资最佳点的存在,并通过东道国与外资之间的博弈均衡分析,针对我国外资优惠政策的调整提出建议,以期合理定位我国的外资优惠政策。
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| 关 键 词： | 东道国 博弈 外资优惠政策 |
| 文章编号： | 1008-472X(2007)06-0080-06 |
| 修稿时间： | 2007年6月7日 |
Analysis of Utilization of Foreign Capital in Host Country Based on Game Equilibrium |
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| HE Qian.Analysis of Utilization of Foreign Capital in Host Country Based on Game Equilibrium[J].Journal of Xidian University (Social Sciences Edition),2007,17(6):80-85. |
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| Authors: | HE Qian |
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| Abstract: | The author,by means of modern economic theories and methods,tries to construct a theoretical framework of game analysis,which aims at the behalf game between the host country and foreign investors.Based on the abstract assumption term,the static game analysis between the host country and foreign investors shows the existence of optimal point of utilizing foreign capital in the host country.The author carries out the equilibrium analysis,and puts forward some advice with adjusting direction of the preferential policy for foreign investors in China,hoping to orient future preferential policy for foreign investors. |
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| Keywords: | Host country Game model Preferential policy for foreign investors |
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