政府奖励机制下闭环供应链的利他关切性决策

考虑政府奖励机制的影响，文章对闭环供应链中的利他关切性决策进行研究。文章首先构建了制造商是否利他关切的两种分散决策和集中决策模型，并求解给出最优回收决策和政府最优奖励决策；然后，对各模型的最优决策进行比较分析，讨论制造商的利他关切对决策的影响。在此基础上，设计“数量折扣联合固定费用-成本共担”契约，对闭环供应链系统进行协调。最后，通过数值算例验证模型结论。研究表明：(1)政府奖励强度的设置存在阈值。只有当奖励强度大于阈值时，奖励机制才有效，才能促进废旧品的回收。(2)制造商的利他关切行为有利于系统获利，但不利于制造商利润的增长，但是这种利他行为扩大了制造商和零售商的谈判空间，有利于协调机制的实施；(3)政府最优奖励强度与WEEE回收价格和价格敏感系数正相关，与利他系数正相关。并且，政府奖励强度的增加有利于“数量折扣联合固定费用-成本共担”契约协调机制的达成。

Altruistic Decision-making of Closed-loop Supply Chain under Government Incentive Mechanism

With the environmental harm caused by Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) becoming more and more serious, recycling activities have become important ways to promote the environment and economy. However, fewer enterprises spontaneously participate in the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) due to the limitations of technology and funds, which leads to the implementation of incentive mechanism by the government to encourage enterprises to recycle. Then, manufacturers consider not only their profits but also the profits of retailers and recyclers to maintain the stable operation of CLSC. Thus, considering the impact of government incentive mechanism and the altruistic concerns, three decision-making models of the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) are constructed, namely, decentralized decision-making models with and without manufacturers' altruistic concerns and centralized decision-making model. The optimal decision on recycling and the optimal decision on government incentive mechanism are given. Then, the influences of government incentive mechanism and manufacturer’s altruistic concerns on these decisions are discussed. Moreover, the optimal reward decision of the government under two kinds of decentralized decision is solved and analyzed. On this basis, the ‘quantity discount joint fixed fee-cost sharing’ contract is designed to achieve system coordination. Finally, numerical analysis is employed to verify conclusions.