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中介机构参与下联盟企业知识转移的三方利益博弈分析
引用本文:吴洁,吴小桔,车晓静,李鹏,盛永祥,施琴芬.中介机构参与下联盟企业知识转移的三方利益博弈分析[J].中国管理科学,2018,26(10):176-186.
作者姓名:吴洁  吴小桔  车晓静  李鹏  盛永祥  施琴芬
作者单位:1. 江苏科技大学经济管理学院, 江苏 镇江 212003; 2. 苏州科技大学, 江苏 苏州 215009
基金项目:国家社科基金重点项目(14AGL001);国家自然基金资助项目(71471091);江苏高校哲学社会科学研究重点项目(2018SJZDI053)
摘    要:知识转移是企业保存知识、提升创新能力的重要途径,中介机构在转移过程中发挥了重要作用。本文以联盟企业间知识转移为研究对象,考虑了企业的不同心理压力,首先建立了联盟企业双方的讨价还价博弈模型;其次构建了考虑中介机构参与知识转移的博弈模型,分析和讨论三方收益变化的影响因素及策略选择。结果表明,在直接知识转移博弈中,转移主体的收益大小与自身的心理压力呈负相关,而与对方的心理压力呈正相关,同等心理压力下知识转出方占优;中介机构参与博弈情形下,中介机构作为协作角色的博弈收益仅受博弈双方心理压力影响,且与知识接收方协作可获得更大收益,而主导角色博弈情形下收益受到三方主体心理压力的综合影响,并在主导知识接收博弈时获得收益更大;中介机构的角色选择与知识转出方心理压力变化相关性不明显,主要受到知识接收方及自身心理压力影响。

关 键 词:知识转移  讨价还价  中介机构  协作博弈  主导博弈  非对称压力  
收稿时间:2016-06-30
修稿时间:2017-03-20

Interests Gaming Analysis of Knowledge Transfer Among Three Parties Based on the Participation of Intermediary Organ
WU Jie,WU Xiao-ju,CHE Xiao-jing,LI Peng,SHENG Yong-xiang,SHI Qin-fen.Interests Gaming Analysis of Knowledge Transfer Among Three Parties Based on the Participation of Intermediary Organ[J].Chinese Journal of Management Science,2018,26(10):176-186.
Authors:WU Jie  WU Xiao-ju  CHE Xiao-jing  LI Peng  SHENG Yong-xiang  SHI Qin-fen
Affiliation:1. Economics & Management School, Jiangsu University of Science and Technology, Zhenjiang 212003, China; 2. Suzhou University of Science and Technology, Suzhou 215009, China
Abstract:Knowledge transfer is a complicated game process and intermediaries play a vital role. Knowledge transfer in alliance is taken as research objects and enterprises' different psychological pressures are considered. Firstly the bargaining game model between the two knowledge transfer subjects is established, then taking into the participation of the intermediary organ,this study analyzes how the revenues of the three subjects change and the influence factors.The results prove that the benefits of transfer subjects have a negative relation with subjects' mental stress and a positive relation with the opposite side's mental stress.In the process of bargaining, if the knowledge transfer subject has greater pressure, he is more likely to compromise and get fewer benefits. Knowledge transferor is in the ascendant if the two knowledge transfer subjects have the same psychological pressure. The revenue of intermediary organ is affected by the psychological pressures of game players under the participation model.When the intermediary organ cooperates with the knowledge transferor, his own pressure has little effect on the revenue. The receiver and the intermediary organ can earn large part of the revenue when the game agents have the same psychological pressure. When the intermediary organ cooperates with the knowledge receiver, his own pressure has large effect on the revenue. The transferor and the intermediary organ can earn large part of the revenue when the game agents have the same psychological pressure. At the same time, the revenue of intermediary organ is bigger when cooperating with knowledge receiver under the participation model. The revenue of intermediary organ is affected by the psychological pressures of three subjects under the dominant model. When the intermediary organ dominant the game instead of the knowledge transferor, he can earn revenue only if his pressure is lower than the knowledge transferor. The revenue has a positive relationship with knowledge transferor, but a negative relationship with knowledge receiver. When the intermediary organ dominant the game instead of the knowledge receiver, he can earn revenue only if his pressure is lower than the knowledge receiver. The revenue has a positive relationship with knowledge receiver, but a negative relationship with knowledge transferor. What's more, the role choices of intermediary organ has nothing to do with knowledge transferor's psychological pressure, it is mainly affected by the psychological pressure of knowledge receiver and intermediary organ himself. When the intermediary organ plays games with knowledge receiver, he should choose the cooperation model when both of their pressures are large. When the intermediary organ plays games with knowledge transferor, he should choose the cooperation model when the pressure of knowledge transferor is large.
Keywords:knowledge transfer  bargaining game  intermediary organ  cooperation model  dominant model  asymmetric stress  
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