政府治理视角下平台电商信用监管的动态演化博弈研究

为破解不完全信息下平台电商的信用“监管困局”，本研究在平台电商、消费者与政府三元主体联动关系的基础上，分别构建政府动态惩罚机制与激励机制下平台电商与消费者的演化博弈模型，并分析平台电商与消费者之间策略选择的影响因素及演化路径。研究表明：在政府监管下，平台电商与消费者通过长期的反复博弈、调整的过程，最终博弈系统演化轨迹呈逐渐收敛的趋势。具体而言，政府动态惩罚机制下，当政府惩罚力度逐渐增加时，平台电商倾向于选择“自律”策略；政府动态激励机制下，当政府对平台电商的激励逐渐增加时，平台电商倾向于选择“自律”策略。更为重要的是，当政府的惩罚力度大于激励政策力度时，政府实施惩罚性政策但没有激励政策的效果要优于政府实施激励政策但不实施惩罚性政策的效果。而当政府的惩罚力度小于激励政策力度时，政府实施激励政策但不实施惩罚性政策的效果与政府实施惩罚性政策但没有激励政策的效果几乎接近。由此可见，政府应将惩罚机制与激励机制相结合适度监管，以此追求信用监管的动态平衡。另外，消费者对平台电商的声誉评价具有两面性：当消费者对平台电商声誉评价越高时，平台电商倾向于选择“自律”策略；而消费者对平台电商声誉评价越低，平台电商反而倾向于选择“不自律”策略。

Research on Dynamic Evolutionary Game of Platform E-commerce Credit Supervision from the Perspective of Government Governance

There are interactive and adaptive evolutionary courses between the e-commerce platform and consumers. Usually, the actions between e-commerce platform and consumers does not happen simultaneously. In this study, Stackelberg game model is built, where the self-discipline strategy adopted by e-commerce platform and the trust strategy adopted by consumers. In order to crack the credit “regulatory dilemma” of the e-commerce platform under incomplete information, the evolutionary game model under the dynamic penalty mechanism and incentive mechanism are constructed. Firstly, the replicator dynamic function can be described. Secondly, the influencing factors and evolution path of strategic choice between platform e-commerce and consumers are analyzed. Lastly, a numerical analysis is conducted to compare the implementation effect of the dynamic penalty mechanism and incentive mechanism. The results show that the evolutionary track of the e-commerce platform and the consumer through the long-term repeated game, portrays a stable equilibrium and spiral convergence. Specifically, the self-discipline strategy adopted by e-commerce platform when the government enhances the penalty intensity under the dynamic penalty mechanism and incentive mechanism. Moreover, the effect is the same between the penalty mechanism and the incentive mechanism when the government's punishment is smaller than the incentive policy. In addition, it has two-sides, that is, the evaluation of consumer reputation for the e-commerce platform, and the self-discipline strategy adopted by e-commerce platform when the evaluation of consumer reputation for platform e-commerce is higher. However, the non-self-discipline strategy adopted by e-commerce platform when the evaluation of consumer reputation for the e-commerce platform is lower. This research has important research significance and application worthy for the governance of trading on the platform, and it also provides a reference for e-commerce and sellers on the e-commerce platforms.