制造商竞争下闭环供应链的押金返还制度研究

本文研究制造商竞争环境下，政府对闭环供应链成员实施押金返还制度时，废旧电器电子产品的回收决策问题。首先构建了制造商完全垄断情形的闭环供应链基准决策模型，然后考虑制造商之间的竞争，分别构建政府对制造商和对回收商实施押金返还制度的闭环供应链决策模型，最后对结果进行比较和分析。研究表明：押金返还制度可以使新产品的零售价和废旧产品的回购价降低；制造商间的竞争和押金返还制度均可以提高闭环供应链中废旧电器电子产品的回收率；与对制造商实施押金返还制度的情形相比，对回收商实施押金返还制度时闭环供应链的总利润和回收率更高。

Deposit-refund System of a Closed-loop Supply Chain under Competition between Manufacturers

The rapid development of information technology and diversification of consumer demand have accelerated the upgrading speed of electronic products, which results in a dilemma thatwaste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) becomes fastest growing garbage in the world. How to collect and reprocess WEEE, therefore, becomes an important issue related to the sustainable development of our society, economy and environment. The main objective of government-driven deposit-return system is to improve environmental benefits, that is, to save resources and protect environment. This is beneficial for government to urge supply chain members to collect WEEE, which can improve resource utilization and effectively control environmental pollution.Therefore, decision-making is investigated on collecting and remanufacturing WEEE when government implements deposit-return system for closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) under competition between two manufacturers.Then, a CLSC decision model for governmentis constructed to implement deposit-return system for manufacturers orcollector under manufacturer competition.Finally, the model results are compared and analyzed.Through analysis of three models and their equilibrium solutions, the main conclusions are shown as follows. (i) The buyback price of WEEE is not related to competition between two manufacturers, but it will be affected by deposit-return system. The buyback price is lower when deposit-return system is implemented for collector. (ii) The retail prices of two manufacturers are relatively lower when deposit-return system is implemented for collector. Under certain conditions, the retail price of manufacturer R is lower when two manufacturers compete. (iii) Both competition between manufacturers and deposit-return system are conducive to enhancing the collection rate of WEEE. (iv) Overall, deposit-return system is effective. From the perspective of consumers and improving the collection rate, the effect is best when it is implemented for collector, but the profit of collector will be impaired. Therefore, government should pay attention to the impact on collector, thus ensuring its enthusiasm for collecting WEEE. With the obtained results of deposit-return system, decision-making basis and management insights can be provided for both government and stakeholders in a CLSC.