| 四方控制权制衡、自由现金流量与过度投资行为 |
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| 引用本文： | 李丽君,金玉娜.四方控制权制衡、自由现金流量与过度投资行为[J].管理评论,2010(2). |
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| 作者姓名： | 李丽君 金玉娜 |
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| 作者单位： | 东北大学工商管理学院; |
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| 基金项目： | 辽宁省自然科学基金项目(20072027); 中国博士后科学基金项目(2005037229); 中央高校基本科研业务费资助(N090406007) |
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| 摘 要： | 目前关于过度投资的研究主要集中在债务融资对过度投资行为的影响上,关于公司控制权制衡与过度投资行为关系的研究基本还是空白。本文通过对自由现金流量和过度投资行为的进一步分析,从控制权制衡角度出发,构建以股东、董事会、监事会和债权人四方为主的过度投资行为制衡模型,研究我国上市公司控制权制衡、自由现金流量与过度投资行为之间的关系。
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| 关 键 词： | 自由现金流量 过度投资 控制权制衡 成长机会 负债相机控制 |
Fourth Party Balance Control Rights,Free Cash Flow and Over-investment |
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| Li Lijun , Jin Yuna.Fourth Party Balance Control Rights,Free Cash Flow and Over-investment[J].Management Review,2010(2). |
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| Authors: | Li Lijun Jin Yuna |
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| Affiliation: | Li Lijun , Jin Yuna(School of Business Administration,Northeastern University,Shenyang 110004) |
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| Abstract: | Current researches of over-investment mainly concentrates on the influence that debt financing has on over-investment,and the relationship between balance control rights and over-investment remains basically untouched.Through further analysis of free cash flow and over-investment,this paper establishes the balance model of shareholder,director board,supervisory board and creditor to the over-investment behavior of manager from the point of balance control rights.The relationship among balance control rights... |
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| Keywords: | free cash flow over-investment balance control rights growth opportunity liability contingent control |
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