| 审计行为、审计合谋及奖惩机制的演化博弈 |
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| 引用本文： | 公彦德,时现.审计行为、审计合谋及奖惩机制的演化博弈[J].系统管理学报,2012,21(3):421-427. |
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| 作者姓名： | 公彦德 时现 |
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| 作者单位： | 南京审计学院国际审计学院,南京,211815 |
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| 基金项目： | 江苏省高校优势学科建设工程资助项目，国家社会科学基金资助项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 针对目前普遍存在的审计合谋现象,依据演化博弈理论,建立了审计师甲和乙的演化博弈模型,分析了两类个体在合谋与诚信两种策略下的行为特征,根据复制者动态方程得到了两者的行为演化规律和政府奖励惩罚机制下的行为演化和演化稳定策略,给出了避免出现审计合谋现象的惩罚和奖励策略,分析了政府实施奖励惩罚机制的有效性。最后,通过数值分析对结论加以说明。
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| 关 键 词： | 审计合谋 演化博弈 演化稳定策略 |
Evolutionary Game Analysis on Audit Conduct, Audit Collusion and Rewarding/Punishing Mechanism |
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| GONG Yan-de
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SHI Xian.Evolutionary Game Analysis on Audit Conduct, Audit Collusion and Rewarding/Punishing Mechanism[J].Systems Engineering Theory·Methodology·Applications,2012,21(3):421-427. |
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| Authors: | GONG Yan-de SHI Xian |
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| Affiliation: | (School of International Audit,Nanjing Audit College,Nanjing 211815,China) |
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| Abstract: | Audit Collusion is a common phenomenon.An evolutionary game model is established with regard to auditors involved.Auditor’s behavior characteristics is analyzed,auditor’s behavior evolutionary law and evolutionary stable strategy of rewarding or punishing mechanism using dynamic equations,reward and punishment strategy of avoiding audit collusion is proposed,and the effectiveness of punishment/award mechanism of government is analyzed.A numerical examples provided to illustrate the theoretical analysis. |
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| Keywords: | audit collusion evolutionary game evolutionary stable strategy |
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