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双寡头零售市场绿色营销演化博弈分析
引用本文:金常飞,曹二保,赖明勇.双寡头零售市场绿色营销演化博弈分析[J].系统工程学报,2012,27(3):383-389.
作者姓名:金常飞  曹二保  赖明勇
作者单位:1. 湖南大学经济与贸易学院,湖南长沙410079;湖南省物流信息与仿真技术重点实验室,湖南长沙410000
2. 湖南大学经济与贸易学院,湖南长沙,410079
3. 湖南省物流信息与仿真技术重点实验室,湖南长沙,410000
基金项目:国家杰出青年科学基金资助项目,国家自然科学基金资助项目
摘    要:基于演化博弈理论和Hotelling模型研究绿色供应链中零售商的最佳营销策略,分析了两零售商之间的绿色营销策略博弈关系.结果显示消费者对绿色效用的偏好程度以及政府对零售商补贴等因素,直接影响零售商的市场份额和收益,进而影响其营销模式.研究结果表明:政府的补贴调控机制是实现零售市场绿色管理的方法之一,但补贴只有达到一定量时,政府的调控机制才会发挥作用.此外政府应加大对绿色环保的宣传力度,提高公众的绿色环保意识,进一步实现绿色供应链的可持续发展.

关 键 词:绿色供应链  绿色营销  演化博弈  消费者偏好

Analysis on green marketing strategy of duopoly retailing market based on the evolutionary game theory
JIN Chang-fei , CAO Er-bao , LAI Ming-yong.Analysis on green marketing strategy of duopoly retailing market based on the evolutionary game theory[J].Journal of Systems Engineering,2012,27(3):383-389.
Authors:JIN Chang-fei  CAO Er-bao  LAI Ming-yong
Affiliation:1.School of Economy and Trade,Hunan University,Changsha 410079,China; 2.Key Lab of Logistics Information and Simulation Technology of Hunan Province,Changsha 410000,China )
Abstract:In order to investigate the optimal marketing strategies of retailers in green supply chain,this paper studied the green marketing strategy game between the retailers by evolutionary game theory and Hotelling model.The game analysis showed that the consumer’s preferences for the green utility and the subsidies from the government directly affected the market share,income and marketing modes of the retailers.Finally,the paper proved that the subsidy control mechanism of the government was one of the methods to implement green management of retail markets.However,only when the subsidies satisfied a certain amount,could government regulation achieve the function.Additionally,the government should enhance propaganda to raise the environmental awareness and achieve sustainable development.
Keywords:green supply chain  green marketing  evolutionary game theory  consumer preference
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