信息非对称条件下BT 项目质量控制决策

为研究不同信息条件下BT项目质量监督控制策略和控制水平,首先了建立BT甲、乙双方质量控制策略的博弈模型,讨论了对称信息下的质量预防和工程款支付决策.其中,质量监督控制水平及有效性和工程款支付决策是BT甲方的决策变量,质量预防控制水平是BT乙方的决策变量.基于该博弈模型重点研究了非对称信息下BT甲方质量监督及有效性水平和工程款支付决策问题,考虑了BT乙方(承包商)质量自我控制以及质量评价信息隐匿情况下,运用极大值原理推导了BT甲方质量监督控制水平和工程款支付决策问题的最优解.最后结合一个公路BT项目进行了计算和分析,对比了不同信息环境下的质量决策结果和质量监督激励成本的变化,实例的计算结果进一步验证了该质量控制决策方法的有效性.

Quality Control Decision Analysis in BT Project under Asymmetic Information

In this paper,we study quality control policy and quality supervise level in BT project under different information back-grounds,we set up a game model between BT project owner and the contractor about quality control policy,discuss the quality supervise and money payment decision problem under symmetric information.In the models,quality supervise level and money payment variables for contract are decided by BT project owner,quality prevention level variables for contract are decided by BT contractor.Focus on the study of quality supervise and money payment decision problem under asymmetric information.Maximum principle is used to solve the optimum solution to quality supervise level and money payment variables by BT project owner when BT contractor control and self-evalution information is hard to observe completely.At last,count and analyse is done concerned with an highway BT project's quality control and those change of quality supervise cost,analyse results under different information setting are contrasted and analyzed.Results come from the example also show the validity of this quality control decision.