首页 | 官方网站   微博 | 高级检索  
     

多目标合作博弈最小二乘预核仁与核仁解
引用本文:江彬倩,李登峰,林萍萍.多目标合作博弈最小二乘预核仁与核仁解[J].系统工程理论与实践,2020,40(3):691-702.
作者姓名:江彬倩  李登峰  林萍萍
作者单位:1. 福州大学 经济与管理学院, 福州 350108;2. 电子科技大学 经济与管理学院, 成都 611731
基金项目:国家自然科学基金(71231003)
摘    要:在实际生活中,常常存在许多带有不对等的联盟和不止一个关联或无关目标的复杂博弈情景.对此,本文首先构建了带有与联盟、目标相关的综合权重的多目标合作博弈,并在此基础上提出含有关联目标与无关目标的混合多目标合作博弈最小二乘预核仁与核仁解求解模型.其次,我们将经典的合作博弈最小二乘预核仁求解方法与核仁解算法推广到多目标合作博弈中,利用拉格朗日乘子法与伪逆理论得到了多目标合作博弈的最小二乘预核仁的显性表达式与最小二乘核仁解算法,并通过凸函数的性质,重新证明了该算法的有效性.最后,利用水资源的数值算例,说明并验证了文中构建的模型的正确性与有效性,并通过对比可知所构建模型的优越性.

关 键 词:多目标合作博弈  最小二乘预核仁解  最小二乘核仁解  联盟不对等  目标关联性
收稿时间:2018-09-13

Least squares prenucleolus and nucleolus solution of multi-objective cooperative games
JIANG Binqian,LI Dengfeng,LIN Pingping.Least squares prenucleolus and nucleolus solution of multi-objective cooperative games[J].Systems Engineering —Theory & Practice,2020,40(3):691-702.
Authors:JIANG Binqian  LI Dengfeng  LIN Pingping
Affiliation:1. School of Economics and Management, Fuzhou University, Fuzhou 350108, China;2. School of Management and Economics, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China
Abstract:In the real life, there exist many complicated game situations with the unequal coalitions and more than one relevant or irrelevant objections. First of all, this paper constructs the multi-objective cooperative games with comprehensive weights, and those weights are associated with coalitions and objections. Then the least squares prenucleolus model and the least squares nucleolus model of the multi-objective cooperative games are proposed with hybrid objections, including the irrelevant objections and relevant objections. Second, the methods of least squares prenucleolus and the algorithm of least squares nucleolus in the classical cooperative games are extended to the multi-objective cooperative games. Using Lagrange multiplier method and pseudo-inverse theory, we have the explicit expression of the least squares prenucleolus of the multi-objective cooperative games and an algorithm for least squares nucleolus of the multi-objective cooperative games, and also prove the validity of the algorithm by properties of convex function. Finally, the correctness and effectiveness of the proposed models are verified though an numerical example of water resources allocation, and the advantages of the proposed models are reflected by comparison.
Keywords:multi-objective cooperative games  least squares prenucleolus  least squares nucleolus  coalition inequality  objection relavancy  
本文献已被 CNKI 维普 等数据库收录!
点击此处可从《系统工程理论与实践》浏览原始摘要信息
点击此处可从《系统工程理论与实践》下载全文
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司    京ICP备09084417号-23

京公网安备 11010802026262号