| Abstract: | The objective of this paper is to use a computable general equilibrium (CGE) methodology to estimate the economic gains, for both Canada and Mexico, of: (1) adopting a North American customs union (CU) that would also liberalise rules of origin (ROO); and (2) reviving the WTO scenario of multilateral free trade, thereby eliminating preferential commerce and thus the need for preferential ROO across free trade agreements (FTAs). Such a CGE methodology is useful as the approach permits computation of an efficiency (or ex post) cost of ROO that might, in some contexts, be more relevant than the existing ex ante indices of ROO restrictiveness, which are unable to account for the fact that the use of preferential access in an FTA (and the concomitant ROO compliance) is an option, not an obligation. The paper shows that the erosion of NAFTA tariff preferences at the end of the 1990s and early 2000s, which resulted from a different phasing of the NAFTA and Uruguay Round measures, has reduced the efficiency cost of NAFTA ROO, making these rules economically less relevant, especially for Canada, and therefore limiting somewhat the gains from liberalising them through a CU. Given this, the WTO scenario of multilateral free trade remains the approach that would deliver the largest economic gains in terms of GDP and welfare, while making preferential commerce and ROO obsolete. |
