多级工程供应链多边激励机制研究

基于业主、总承包商、分包商之间的多级委托代理关系，分别构建“业主—总承包商” 一级激励机制模型和“业主—总承包商—两个分包商” 二级激励机制模型，分析信息结构对多级工程供应链中多边决策行为的影响。研究发现: 无论是一级激励还是二级激励， 多边不对称信息的存在使得总承包商获得信息租金，从而扭曲总承包商工作努力和业主的收益； 业主在选择合作伙伴时， 委托代理链越长， 越要谨慎考察总承包商的能力水平；随着委托代理链的增长，业主和总承包商宁愿降低自身收益，以激励总承包商和分包商努力工作。

Research on Multilateral Incentive Mechanism ofMulti-Echelon Engineering Supply Chain

The first-level incentive mechanism model of "owner-general contractor" and the second-level incentive mechanismmodel of "owner-general contractor=two subcontractors" are respectively constructed based on the multi-echelon principal-agentrelationship between the owner ， general contractor, and subcontractors. The influence of information structure on thedecision-making behaviors of all participants in multi-echelon engineering supply chain is analyzed. The results show that thegeneral contractor obtains information rent because of multilateral asymmetric information， which distorts the work effort of thegeneral contractor and the income of the owner. The general contractor’s comprehensive ability level should be carefully examined asa partner in a multi-echelon principal-agent chain with the growth of the principal-agent chain. The owner and the generalcontractor’s income would be willing to be reduced to incentivize the general contractor and subcontractors to work harder.