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基于提前期压缩的供应链博弈模型
引用本文:吕芹,霍佳震.基于提前期压缩的供应链博弈模型[J].系统管理学报,2009,18(6).
作者姓名:吕芹  霍佳震
作者单位:同济大学,经济与管理学院,上海,200092
摘    要:讨论基于提前期压缩的二阶供应链博弈问题,该供应链包括一个供应商和一个采购商.供应商采取批量分解方式向采购商供货.供应链成员通过提前期赶工的方式压缩提前期,降低成本.分别以供应商和采购商总成本最小化为目标,建立了由采购商为主方、供应商为从方的Stackelberg博弈模型.对提前期未赶工和提前期赶工2种情况下,采购商、供应商和系统三方的成本进行了对比,并对赶工后三方的成本节约情况进行比较分析.最后给出了算例和仿真,讨论了相关参数变化对采购商,供应商和系统三方总成本节约额的影响,并证明基于提前期压缩的博弈决策方式的有效性.

关 键 词:提前期压缩  赶工成本  斯坦克尔伯格博弈  帕累托优化

A Study on Supply Chain Game Model Based on Lead-time Compression
LU Qin,HUO Jia-zhen.A Study on Supply Chain Game Model Based on Lead-time Compression[J].Systems Engineering Theory·Methodology·Applications,2009,18(6).
Authors:LU Qin  HUO Jia-zhen
Abstract:A problem of two-stage supply chain game model based on lead-time compression is discussed. The supply chain consists of one supplier and one buyer. The supplier adopts a lot-partitioning supply method. The members of the supply chain gain the lead-time compression by lead-time crashing. A Stackelberg game model is erected to gain the optimal cost of the buyer and the supplier. A comparison is given to compare the cost of the buyer, supplier and the system with and without lead-time crashing, and the savings of the cost among the third parties is analyzed, too. Finally, a numerical example and simulation analysis is given to show the effect of the variety of the parameters on the savings of the cost of the buyer the supplier and total system. The validity of the method of game decision based on Lead-time compression is showed.
Keywords:lead-time compression  crashing cost  Stackelberg game  Pareto improvement
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