考虑过度自信的交叉持股供应链决策研究

过度自信作为一种典型的决策者非理性行为特征，会对交叉持股供应链成员的决策产生影响。鉴于此，本文旨在探讨存在过度自信的交叉持股供应链的决策问题。考虑到供应链成员的过度自信特征，在制造商和零售商均完全理性、仅制造商过度自信、仅零售商过度自信以及二者均过度自信的四种模式下，本文构建了制造商与零售商交叉持股的供应链模型，运用了 Stackelberg博弈方法对模型进行求解，讨论了过度自信及交叉持股比例对供应链成员决策的影响，并通过数值仿真对结论进行验证。研究表明：当市场环境较好时，交叉持股的任何一方过度自信程度的提高会使自身利润下降，而使另一方利润提高；当市场环境较差时，制造商过度自信会使双方的收益都受损，而零售商过度自信会使自身利润提升，使制造商收益下降；制造商和零售商可以通过调整交叉的持股比例来调节过度自信对利润的影响。

Study on a Cross-shareholding Supply Chain Decision Considering Over-confidence

Overconfidence, as a typical irrational behavior characteristic, will inevitably affect the decision-making of cross-shareholding supply chain. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the decision-making problem of cross-shareholding supply chain with overconfidence. Therefore, a Stackelberg game model of supply chain decision-making with cross-shareholding is constructed between manufacturer and retailer. Based on the overconfidence characteristics of supply chain members, four models are established：in which both manufacturer and retailer are completely rational, only manufacturer is overconfident, only retailer is overconfident, and both of them are overconfident. Finally, the influence of overconfidence and cross-shareholding ratio on the decision-making of supply chain members is discussed, and the conclusions are verified by numerical simulation. The results demonstrate: (1)When the market environment is good, the increase of overconfidence of either party of cross-shareholding will reduce its own profit and increase the profit of the other party; (2)When the market environment is poor, the manufacturer’s overconfidence will lead to the decrease of both sides’ profit, while the retailer’s overconfidence will increase their own profit but damage the manufacturer’s profit; (3) Manufacturers and retailers can adjust the impact of overconfidence on profits by changing the cross-shareholding ratio.