中小制造企业在线直销与传统分销双渠道定价决策研究

针对传统渠道中处于非主导地位的中小制造企业开展双渠道销售时存在的价格冲突问题,考虑产品数字属性对渠道需求的影响,构建了制造商与零售商独立决策和制造商占非主导地位两种情况下的双渠道定价决策模型,给出了两种情况下的双渠道最优定价,并分别考察了产品数字属性变化以及决策权利结构不同对最优定价的影响。研究结果表明,处于非主导地位的中小制造企业应采用依从强势零售商的定价策略,该策略有利于制造商和零售商以及渠道整体收益的增加;随着产品数字属性的增大,制造商的最优定价相应地提高,而零售商的最优定价则相应地降低;制造商占非主导地位时的双渠道最优定价高于制造商与零售商独立决策时的双渠道最优定价。

Pricing Strategies in Dual-channel for Small and Medium-Sized Manufacturers

When SMMs (Small and Medium-sized Manufacturers) sell their products in both the traditional retail channel and online direct channel, they usually suffer prices conflicts with their retailer as they are non-dominant in the traditional retail channel. In this paper, a spatial competition equilibrium model is developed to describe pricing and coordination in dual-channel. The impact of digital attributes of product on the demand of dual-channel is also quantified in our model. Then optimal pricing strategies are presented in two power structures, a manufacturer and a retailer making decisions independently, and a retailer leading and a manufacturer following in Stackelberg game. Furthermore, the impact of the digital attributes of product and power structure changing on optimal pricing is investigated. Our analyses show that, the non-dominant SMMs' pricing should depend on the dominant retailers'. This strategy helps SMMs and the retailers to optimize their profits, and to improve the total profit of dual-channel. Online direct price increases with the increase of digital attribute of product, while the retail price decreases with the increase of digital attribute. The retail price and the direct price in the retailer leading and the manufacturer following situation are both higher than those in independent decision-making situation. The results are helpful for a large number of SMMs to determine their strategies of pricing and coordinating in dual-channel.