| 股权分置改革后控股股东代理行为实证分析 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 宋力,胡运权.股权分置改革后控股股东代理行为实证分析[J].管理评论,2010(4). |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 宋力 胡运权 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 哈尔滨工业大学管理学院; |
| |
| 基金项目： | 国家社会科学基金项目(05BJY004); 教育部社会科学基金项目(09YJA630101) |
| |
| 摘 要： | 本文借助所构建的控股股东代理行为指数,对股权分置改革后的控股股东代理行为进行了实证研究,研究结果表明:控股股东通过控制上市公司董事会影响上市公司的独立性,间接侵害上市公司和中小股东利益的行为比较普遍;大股东间的股权制衡对控股股东代理行为有抑制作用;增加独立董事比例、保障中小股东的投票权,减少隶属于控股股东单位的公司董事数量,建立适度规模的董事会有利于抑制控股股东代理行为。
|
| 关 键 词： | 控股股东 代理行为指数 股权制衡 公司治理 |
Empirical analysis of controlling shareholder's agency behavior after equity division reform |
| |
| Song Li , Hu Yunquan.Empirical analysis of controlling shareholder's agency behavior after equity division reform[J].Management Review,2010(4). |
| |
| Authors: | Song Li Hu Yunquan |
| |
| Affiliation: | Song Li , Hu Yunquan(School of Management,Harbin Institute of Technology,Harbin 150001) |
| |
| Abstract: | The paper adopts index of controlling shareholder's agency behavior constructed to study controlling shareholder's agency behavior after equity division reform empirically.The results shows that:Controlling shareholders affects listed firms'independence by controlling the board of directors,the behavior of indirectly evading against the interests of listed firms and small and medium-sized shareholders is common;the Power Balance among larger Shareholders is of inhibition for controlling shareholder's agency... |
| |
| Keywords: | controlling shareholder index of agency behavior the Power Balance corporate governance |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 等数据库收录！ |
