计及需求响应的售电公司正偏差电量考核优化模型

偏差电量考核是电力市场化进程中重要的环节之一,也是电力现货市场形成之前的过渡阶段。为了更为直观地表达偏差电量考核对于售电公司的影响,构建了基于偏差电量考核机制下的售电公司收益模型。同时,采取需求响应措施来减少偏差电量,在此基础上建立了以售电公司收益最大化为目标的可中断负荷合同及价差期权合同最优购买模型。以广东电力市场2017年交易数据为基础,对比分析了捆绑合同对售电公司收益的影响,并对月度市场出清价、用户统一价差和补偿费用进行了敏感性分析。结果表明,售电公司可以通过捆绑合同来降低考核费用,从而提高整体收益,同时也降低了用户的用电成本;月度市场出清价和中断负荷补偿费用的变动对偏差电量考核费用的影响最大,用户统一价差对售电公司用户成本影响最大。

Optimal Model for Positive Deviation Penalty of Power Retailers Considering Demand Response

Energy deviation penalty mechanism is an important part in the market-oriented electricity market and also a transitional stage before the formation of the electricity spot market. To express the impact of the deviation penalty on the sales revenue of retailers intuitively, a revenue-based corporate revenue model based on the penalty mechanism is constructed. Meanwhile, the demand response measures are adopted to reduce the amount of deviation electricity. An optimal purchase model of interruptible load contracts and spread options contracts is established with the goal of maximizing the sales revenue of retailers. Based on the transaction data of Guangdong power market in 2017, the impact of bundled contracts on the sale revenue of retailers is analyzed and the sensitivity analysis of monthly market price, user uniform price and compensation cost is carried out. The results show that retailers can reduce the appraisal cost by bundling contracts, then make the overall revenue increase and reduce the user''s costs. In addition, the changes of monthly market price and compensation cost have the greatest impact on the deviation penalty, and the cost of retailers is most affected by user uniform price.