低碳供应链生产及交易决策机制

研究由两个产品制造商和上游碳配额供应商所组成的供应链系统的生产和交易决策问题.通过建立经济主体的主从博弈模型,得到它们之间互为反应函数的纳什均衡解,并在此基础上设定其为产品碳排放量和排放上限的函数.分析表明,产品碳排放量和政府排放上限对两制造商和碳配额供应商最优变量以及利润值的影响呈反向关系;在两制造商严格控制排放量和政府科学制定排放上限的前提下,两级主体可通过某种契约进一步提高各自的利润值.

Low carbon supply chain production and trading decision-making mechanism

The production and trading decision issue of a supply chain consisting of two emission-dependent manufacturers and one emission permit supplier is studied. By the establishment of the three agents’ Stackelberg game model, their mutual reflecting Nash equilibrium solution can be obtained. On this basis, its functions are set as product carbon emission and government’s ′cap-and-trade′ regulation. The analysis results show that the impact of unit product’s carbon emission and the government’s ′cap-and-trade′ regulation on three agents’ optimal values and profits is inversed. Under the premise of controlling of product emissions strictly and setting emissions cap scientifically, two-level economic agents can increase their profits further by means of some contracts.