首页 | 官方网站   微博 | 高级检索  
     

论国有资产管理的委托-代理问题
引用本文:杨淑水,李桂平.论国有资产管理的委托-代理问题[J].工业工程,2000,3(2):28-32.
作者姓名:杨淑水  李桂平
作者单位:1. 广州铁路(集团)公司,广东,广州,510600
2. 长沙铁道学院,湖南,长沙410075
摘    要:从国有企业改革面临的问题出发,认为国有资产管理存在着严重的委托-代理问题,如缺乏有效的监督竞争、存在行政化特征、缺乏市场环境等。这些问题是国有企业改革深化的突破口,解决代理问题的唯一对策的建立企业家的激励与约束机制。从国有企业运行的环境来看,委托-代理的关系的激励约束机制包括四种:产权激励与约束、市场激励与约束、企业激励与约束、政府激励与约束,它们互相作用,构成了企业家的激励约束系统。

关 键 词:代理  企业家  国企改革  国有资产管理  委托
修稿时间:2000-03-21

On Trust-Agency Problems of State-Owned Property Management
YANG Shu-shui,LI Gui-ping.On Trust-Agency Problems of State-Owned Property Management[J].Industrial Engineering Journal,2000,3(2):28-32.
Authors:YANG Shu-shui  LI Gui-ping
Abstract:This article emphasizes the problems that happen in the refom of the state - owned enterprises. It raises an issue that exists in the state - owned Property management: trust-agency problems, for example, lack of effective competition control, the influences of administrative intervention, lack of market environment, etc. These problems are the break Points of deepening state - owned enterprise reform. The only solution to the agen- cy problem is to establish a system of stimulating and control of the entripreneurs. As far as the emvironment of enterprise operating is concerned, the stimulating and control system of the trust - agency relationship includes, the stimulating and control of property rights of market, of enterprise and of govenment. These factors interact with each other and thus compose of the stimulating and control system of entrepreneurs.
Keywords:agency problem  entrepreneur  stimulating and control mechanism  
本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司    京ICP备09084417号-23

京公网安备 11010802026262号