制度内生化均衡过程和我国经济增长制度有效性检验

本文在制度内生化均衡分析的基础上,构建出经济增长制度内生化决定机制。研究认为当事人资源禀赋和控制权结构决定制度安排和制度结构;一国初始资源禀赋和控制权结构决定宏观政治经济制度,制度内生于经济发展并决定经济增长;当事人拥有资源越多和价值越大,控制权结构和资源禀赋越不平衡,制度和经济将越无法获得有效增长。利用我国1978~2005年时序数据进行Johansen协整检验和Granger因果关系检验,结果显示,控制权结构、制度安排与经济增长存在长期均衡关系,控制权结构决定制度并进而决定经济增长效率。

An Empirical Study on the Endogenous Equilibrium Process of Institution and Institution Efficiency of Chinese Economic Growth

This paper initially builds the framework for the deterministic framework of institution of economic growth. It points out that:(1)institution is originated from the resource and the controlling rights structure of the players;(2)the institution game, incentive and surplus rearrangement all show that institution is endogenous in economic growth and determines economic growth;(3)institution is not used to be efficient.One player has more resource,institution will be more unequal and economic growth efficiency will be lower.The empirical study further shows that property rights structure makes the development of institution,and institution makes Chinese economy grow very rapidly and efficiently.