双边信息不对称参与者风险厌恶的应急数量折扣契约

探寻双边信息不对称、一个参与者风险厌恶时,应急数量折扣契约协调供应链应对突发事件的内在规律.借助"利他委托人"理论,科学设置参与者的激励和参与约束条件,在市场价格随机的条件下构建双边信息不对称、一个参与者风险厌恶的应急数量折扣契约.分析信息不对称和风险厌恶对供应链上各决策变量、供应链及链上成员绩效的影响,并通过具体的算例仿真加以验证.研究结果表明:当参与者风险厌恶程度确定时,供销双方信息预测越准确,供应链期望收益越大.但风险厌恶的参与者收益随着信息透明度的增加而增加,风险中性参与者的收益随着信息透明度的增加而减少.当信息不对称状态确定时,参与者风险厌恶程度越高其身收益越大.在双边信息不对称的情况下,参与者的风险防范意识有利于规避风险,但风险厌恶的零售商有相对信息优势,而风险厌恶的供应商没有相对信息优势.

Emergency quantity discount contract for risk aversion of participants under bilateral asymmetric information

In this paper, we explore the intrinsic law of supply chain coordination of the emergency quantity discount contract in response to emergencies under bilateral information asymmetry and risk aversion of one participant. First, we set up the incentive and engagement constraint conditions for participants scientifically with "altruistic principal" theory, and we construct the emergency quantity discount contract model based on the stochastic market prices under the conditions of bilateral information asymmetry and risk aversion of one participant. After that, we analyze the influence of information asymmetry and risk aversion on the decision variables in the supply chain, the performance of the supply chain and its members. Then we verify the results through simulation of specific examples. The results show that under the condition of determined degree of risk aversion for participants, the more accurate the information forecast between the supply and marketing parties, the greater the expected revenue of the supply chain. However, as information transparency increase, so does the revenue of risk-averse participants, while the income of risk-neutral participants will reduce with the drop of information transparency accordingly. We also find that the the higher the risk aversion degree of participants, the greater their own benefits will be based on the determined information asymmetry state. Finally, we come to the conclusion that participants'' awareness of risk prevention is conducive to avoiding risks in the case of bilateral information asymmetry. But retailers of risk aversion have comparative information advantage, while risk-averse suppliers does not have this kind of characteristic.