| 不完全信息下的封闭投标式拍卖机制研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 黄怀志,何铭.不完全信息下的封闭投标式拍卖机制研究[J].上海交通大学学报,1997,31(4):16-22. |
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| 作者姓名： | 黄怀志 何铭 |
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| 摘 要： | 研究了两个投标者参与的，双边不完全信息下的单个不可分物品的封闭投标式拍卖模型，证明了除次高价格拍卖规则外，所有拍卖机制的均衡策略都是连续可微和严格单调增的，并且Ｎａｓｈ均衡集完全由一阶微分方程系统的边值问题所刻划。给出了实例分析，最后讨论了一类特殊的最优拍卖问题。
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| 关 键 词： | 投标 不完全信息 Nash均衡 拍卖 封闭投标式拍卖 |
Research on the Sealed bid Auction Mechanism with Incomplete Information |
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| Huang Huaizhi,He Ming,Wang Huanchen.Research on the Sealed bid Auction Mechanism with Incomplete Information[J].Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University,1997,31(4):16-22. |
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| Authors: | Huang Huaizhi He Ming Wang Huanchen |
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| Affiliation: | Institute of Systems Engineering |
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| Abstract: | A sealed bid auction model for an indivisible object with two bidders and incomplete information on both sides is studied.It is shown that for all auction mechanism,except the second highest bid price rule,all equilibrium strategies are continuously differential and strict monotonically increasing,and morever the set of Nash equilibria is completely described by a boundary value problem for a system of singular differential equations.An example is given.Finally,a particular kind of the optimal auction problem is discussed. |
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| Keywords: | auction bidding incomplete information Nash equilibrium strategy |
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