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短视型与策略型消费者并存的双渠道两阶段动态定价策略
引用本文:李宗活,杨文胜,司银元,刘晓红.短视型与策略型消费者并存的双渠道两阶段动态定价策略[J].系统工程理论与实践,2019,39(8):2080-2090.
作者姓名:李宗活  杨文胜  司银元  刘晓红
作者单位:南京理工大学 经济管理学院, 南京 210094
基金项目:国家自然科学基金(71771122);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金(15YJA630087);江苏省研究生科研与实践创新计划项目(KYCX18_0348)
摘    要:在需求为导向的市场环境下,切实从消费者行为特性角度制定营销策略是双渠道供应链长足发展的关键.本文将消费者策略行为考虑到双渠道供应链中,在理清消费者渠道选择及购买时机选择的基础上,分别构建分散与集中决策下短视型与策略型消费者并存的双渠道动态定价模型,探讨双渠道最优响应策略,并对模型进行数值验算.研究发现:存在两阶段最优定价策略实现供应链利润优化;分散决策全价期定价小于集中决策,但优惠期定价大于集中决策,集中决策下两阶段供应链利润均大于分散决策,有效缓解渠道冲突和双重边际效应;随短视型消费者数量比例的增大,分散决策下的实体与网络渠道价格战越激烈,此时制造商在竞争中占优,而供应链成员合谋行为使实体和网络渠道定到高价,此时零售商在竞争中占优.双方均倾向于提供更大优惠促使消费者尽早作出购买决定.研究结果可为双渠道供应链动态定价提供理论建议.

关 键 词:消费者策略行为  动态定价  双渠道  全价期和优惠期
收稿时间:2018-07-06

Two-period dynamic pricing strategy of dual-channel with myopic and strategic consumers
LI Zonghuo,YANG Wensheng,SI Yinyuan,LIU Xiaohong.Two-period dynamic pricing strategy of dual-channel with myopic and strategic consumers[J].Systems Engineering —Theory & Practice,2019,39(8):2080-2090.
Authors:LI Zonghuo  YANG Wensheng  SI Yinyuan  LIU Xiaohong
Affiliation:School of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Science and Technology, Nanjing 210094, China
Abstract:In the demand-oriented market environment, it is important to take consumer behavior into consideration when designing marketing strategies in dual-channel supply chain. In this article, the consumer behavior strategy is considered in a dual-channel supply chain. Based on the channels' choice and the purchasing time of consumers, the dual-channel dynamic pricing model with myopic and strategic consumers under decentralized and centralized decision-making is constructed. The optimal response mechanism of dual-channel system is analyzed. The model is checked by numerical study. The result shows that, there exists a two-stage optimal pricing strategy to optimize supply chain profit. During the full price period, the pricing in the centralized decision-making is greater than that of decentralized decision-making. However this action reverses in the discount period; pricing under the decentralized decision-making is greater than that of centralized decision-making. The two stages supply chain profit under centralized decision-making is greater than decentralized decision-making, which help to alleviate channel conflicts and double marginalization effect. The increasing proportion of myopic consumer triggers a severe price war between entity and network channels under decentralized decision-making, which empowers manufacturer to earn more profit in the competition. The mutual cooperation of supply chain members leads to high prices for entity and network channels. At this time, retailer has an advantage in the competition. Both parties tend to offer greater incentives for consumers to make purchasing decisions earlier. The research results provide interesting theoretical suggestions for dynamic pricing of dual-channel supply chain.
Keywords:consumer strategy behavior  dynamic pricing  dual-channel  full price period and discount period  
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