不同权力结构下供应链减排策略随机微分博弈

在由单个制造商和单个零售商构成的低碳供应链中,制造商与零售商之间不同的权力结构决定着他们的减排策略与博弈方式.同时,低碳产品商誉与需求受到制造商与零售商减排策略及随机因素的长期动态影响.在不同的权力结构下,对制造商减排努力策略与零售商宣传努力策略进行随机微分博弈分析;在集中式决策基础上,分别构建制造商主导与零售商主导的Stackelberg博弈、无主导Nash博弈模型,求解模型并对结果进行理论分析与数值实验.研究发现:相较于自己作为主导者,对方作为主导者会促使制造商或零售商做出更大的减排努力或宣传努力;与有主导者的供应链相比,无主导者的供应链可能实现更大的低碳产品商誉;制造商作为主导者能够提升低碳产品商誉与需求以及供应链总利润.随机因素促使制造商和零售商分别提高了减排努力和宣传努力以及低碳产品商誉.

Stochastic differential game of supply chain emission reduction strategies under different power structures

In a low-carbon supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer, the different power structures between the manufacturer and the retailer determine their emission reduction strategies and the game ways. At the same time, the goodwill and demand for low carbon products are influenced by the long-term dynamics of the manufacturer''s and the retailer''s abatement strategies and stochastic factors. Stochastic differential game analysis of the manufacturer''s abatement effort strategies and the retailer''s promotional effort strategies under different power structures is conducted. On the basis of centralized decision-making, the manufacturer-dominated and the retailer-dominated Stackelberg game and non-dominant Nash game models are constructed respectively, and the models are solved and the results are analyzed theoretically and numerically. The study finds that the other party''s dominant role will prompt the manufacturer or the retailer to make greater emission reduction effort or promotion effort than their own as the dominant player. A supply chain without a leader may achieve greater goodwill for low-carbon products than a supply chain with a leader. The manufacturer as the leader can increase the goodwill and demand for low carbon products and total profit of the supply chain. Random factors drive the manufacturer and the retailer to increase their emission reduction effort and promotion effort, and low-carbon product goodwill.