8轮PRINCE的快速密钥恢复攻击 |
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作者姓名: | 段春晖 谭林 戚文峰 |
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作者单位: | 中国人民解放军战略支援部队信息工程大学;数学工程与先进计算国家重点实验室 |
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基金项目: | 国家自然科学基金(61521003);国家密码发展基金(MMJJ20170103,MMJJ20180204)。 |
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摘 要: | PRINCE算法是J.Borghoff等在2012年亚密会上提出的一个轻量级分组密码算法,它模仿AES并采用α-反射结构设计,具有加解密相似的特点.2014年,设计者发起了针对PRINCE实际攻击的公开挑战,使得该算法的安全性成为研究的热点.目前对PRINCE攻击的最长轮数是10轮,其中P.Derbez等利用中间相遇技术攻击的数据和时间复杂度的乘积D×T=2125,A.Canteaut等利用多重差分技术攻击的复杂度D×T=2118.5,并且两种方法的时间复杂度都超过了257.本文将A.Canteaut等给出的多重差分技术稍作改变,通过考虑输入差分为固定值,输出差分为选定的集合,给出了目前轮数最长的7轮PRINCE区分器,并应用该区分器对8轮PRINCE进行了密钥恢复攻击.本文的7轮PRINCE差分区分器的概率为2-56.89,8轮PRINCE的密钥恢复攻击所需的数据复杂度为261.89个选择明文,时间复杂度为219.68次8轮加密,存储复杂度为215.21个16比特计数器.相比目前已知的8轮PRINCE密钥恢复攻击的结果,包括将A.Canteaut等给出的10轮攻击方案减少到8轮,本文给出的攻击方案的时间复杂度和D×T复杂度都是最低的.
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关 键 词: | 分组密码 PRINCE 差分分析 |
Faster Key Recovery Attack on 8-Round PRINCE |
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Authors: | DUAN Chun-Hui TAN Lin QI Wen-Feng |
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Affiliation: | (PLA Strategic Support Force Information Engineering University,Zhengzhou 450001,China;State Key Laboratory of Mathematical Engineering and Advanced Computing,Zhengzhou 450001,China) |
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Abstract: | PRINCE is a lightweight block cipher proposed by J.Borghoff et al.at ASIACRYPT 2012.Imitating AES and usingα-reflection design,it possesses the similarity of encryption and decryption.In 2014,the designers launched a public challenge on finding practical attacks on PRINCE.Currently,attacks on PRINCE can reach up to 10 encryption rounds.P.Derbez et al.used meet-in-the-middle technique to attack PRINCE with the data complexity and time complexity satisfying D×T=2125,and A.Canteaut et al.used multiple differential cryptanalysis to attack PRINCE with the data complexity and time complexity satisfying D×T=2118.5.The time complexity of both the two attacks exceeds 257.This paper slightly changes the multiple differential cryptanalysis given by A.Canteaut.By considering the case when the input difference is a fixed value and the output difference falls into a selected set,a distinguisher on 7-round PRINCE with the longest number of rounds is given,which can be used to lunch a key recovery attack on 8-round PRINCE.The differential probability of7-round PRINCE differential distinguisher designed in this paper is 2-56.89.The key recovery attack on 8-round PRINCE is given with data complexity being 261.89chosen plaintext,time complexity being219.688-round PRINCE encryption,and memory complexity being 215.21of 16-bit counters.Compared with the results of key recovery attacks on 8-round PRINCE,including reducing the 10-round attack given by A.Canteaut et al.to 8-round,the time complexity and D×T complexity given in this paper are both the lowest. |
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Keywords: | block cipher PRINCE differential cryptanalysis |
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