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非常损失规则的比较研究--兼评中国民事法律行为制度中的乘人之危和显失公平
引用本文:徐涤宇.非常损失规则的比较研究--兼评中国民事法律行为制度中的乘人之危和显失公平[J].法律科学,2001,1(3):111-119.
作者姓名:徐涤宇
作者单位:徐涤宇(中南财经政法大学,湖北,武汉,430074)
摘    要:以公平价格理论为切入点,从历史考察和比较法的角度分析了非常损失规则发展到暴利行为、显失公平制度的历史背景和思想基础.各国此类制度实质上与我国关于显失公平和乘人之危的立法具有理论联系.在此基础上,乘人之危只是显失公平主观构成要件一种具体表现形式,法律没有必要也不应该将其作为意思表示的瑕疵予以单独规定.

关 键 词:非常损失原则  公平价格理论  程序性公平  显失公平  乘人之危
文章编号:1000-5307(2001)03-0111-(09)
修稿时间:2001年2月9日

A Comparative Study of the Rule of Laesion Enormis
XU Di-yu.A Comparative Study of the Rule of Laesion Enormis[J].Law Science (Journal of Northwest Institute University of Politics and Law),2001,1(3):111-119.
Authors:XU Di-yu
Abstract:With the theory of justum pretium as the point of connection,and from the aspect of historical observation and comparative law,the author analyzes the historical background and ideological basis of the rule of laesio enormis developing into the institution of Wucherisches Geschaft or obvious unfairness.While attempting to disclose the nature of the rule of laesio enormis in different countries,he tries to find the theoretical connection between the rule and the legislation of China on obvious unfairness and exploitation of one's unfavorable position.On this basis,he criticizes the relative theories and legislation in China,and thinks that it is unnecessary,to provide exploitation of one's unfavorable position as one of the defects of declaration of intention.
Keywords:the Rule of Laesio Enormis  the Theory of justum Pretium  Procedual Justice  Obvious Unfairness  Exploitation of One's Unfavorable Position  
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