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BOT项目投资与特许权期的二维招标合同设计
引用本文:吴孝灵,周晶,王冀宁,陈星光.BOT项目投资与特许权期的二维招标合同设计[J].管理工程学报,2012,26(3):191-196.
作者姓名:吴孝灵  周晶  王冀宁  陈星光
作者单位:1. 南京工业大学经济与管理学院,江苏南京210009;南京大学工程管理学院,江苏南京210093
2. 南京大学工程管理学院,江苏南京,210093
基金项目:国家自然科学基金重点资助项目,国家自然科学基金资助项目,教育部人文社会科学研究一般资助项目,江苏省社会科学基金资助项目,江苏省普通高校研究生科研创新计划资助项目,教育部人文社科青年基金资助项目
摘    要:为让管理水平较高的私营集团获得BOT项目特许权,并实现项目社会福利最大,本文利用机制设计理论建立了一个关于BOT项目投资与特许权期的二维招标合同的直接机制模型。通过模型分析,获得了该招标机制的可行性条件,最优形式和相应配置方案,并由一个算例表明,得到的最优招标机制在实际中是有效的。所获结果为政府对BOT特许权招标提供了一种理论指导和实际方法。

关 键 词:BOT项目  项目投资  特许权期  招标合同  最优机制

The Effect of Two-dimensional Tender Contract Design on Investment and Concession Term for BOT Projects
WU Xiao-ling , ZHOU Jing , WANG Ji-ning , CHEN Xing-guang.The Effect of Two-dimensional Tender Contract Design on Investment and Concession Term for BOT Projects[J].Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management,2012,26(3):191-196.
Authors:WU Xiao-ling  ZHOU Jing  WANG Ji-ning  CHEN Xing-guang
Affiliation:1.School of Economics and Management,Nanjing University of Technology,Nanjing 210009,China; 2.School of Management and Engineering,Nanjing University,Nanjing 210093,China)
Abstract:Tendering and bidding are two important trading mechanisms.However,many Build-Operate-Transfer(BOT) projects are having issues with the concession bid.For instance,private groups sometimes falsify bidding information in order to win a bid from Chinese government.Therefore,it is important to redesign tendering and bidding mechanisms in order to maximize the social welfare of a BOT project.There is a lack of study on concession tender issues for BOT projects.This paper investigates a two-dimensional tender problem associated with BOT project’s investment and concession period.We also consider the effect of the concession period on the private investment in the tendering practice. A direct tendering mechanism model on BOT project’s investment and concession period is proposed according to the mechanism design theory.The proposed model can help derive the feasible condition,optimal form,and corresponding distribution program for the implementation of tendering mechanism.Firstly,it is difficult for the government to know the private group’s information,such as the management level in the tendering process.A direct tendering mechanism model on the BOT project’s investment and concession term is proposed.The model enables us to obtain the optimal direct tender mechanism and test its feasibility. Secondly,to select the private group with the highest management level for the project implementation,the distribution program for the BOT project’s concession tender is discussed based on the analysis of optimal direct tender mechanism.The discussion results indicate that the BOT concession tender with the inclusion of the competing bidding variable can not only help the government choose a private investor with the highest management level from the fury competing market,but also maximize the project’s benefits. Finally,the analysis of a computing example shows that the obtained conclusions not only are valid and applicable,but also provide the government with a theoretical guidance and a practical approach for implementing BOT project’s concession tender.
Keywords:BOT project  project investment  concession term  tender contract  optimal mechanism
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