基于政府补贴的企业最优减排技术选择研究

通过构建三阶段博弈模型,得到了清洁工艺治污和末端治污企业的减排研发绩效,并进一步利用数值模拟方法分析了最优补贴政策下,技术溢出率、污染损害程度及排污税对企业治污技术选择的影响。研究表明:无补贴政策下,企业最优的选择为末端治污技术,经济和环境无法取得双赢。最优补贴政策下,当污染损害在一定范围内时,无论技术溢出率取何值,基于利润最大化和政府福利最大化视角,企业的最优技术选择都为清洁工艺治污技术。最优补贴政策下,无论排污税取何值,清洁工艺治污模式下的企业利润都高于末端治污模式下的企业利润;排污税影响不同治污模式下的社会福利水平,当排污税较小时,清洁工艺治污模式下的福利水平大于末端治污模式下的情形,当排污税较大时,末端治污模式下的福利水平大于清洁工艺治污模式下的情形,为保证企业的减排技术选择和政府的选择一致,取得经济和环境无法取得双赢,政府应设置一个合理的排污税水平。

Choice of Optimal Environmental Technology Based on Government Subsidy

A three-stage dynamic game model between government and firm to is constructed explore the firm's optimal R&D investment and the government optimal subsidy policy under different abatement technology modes. Moreover, a numerical method is used to analysis the factors that influence the firm's abatement and social performance. First, the R&D subsidy policy is always welfare-enhancing rather than the case of laissez-faire. Second, with the optimal subsidy policy, output, R&D investment, profit, and social welfare under the progress integrated abatement technology scenario become greater than those under end-of-pipe abatement technology for any value of the spillover. Social welfare under the progress integrated abatement technology scenario becomes greater than those under end-of-pipe abatement if the emission tax is sufficiently small. Moreover, output, R&D investment, profit, and social welfare under the progress integrated abatement technology scenario become greater than those under end-of-pipe abatement technology if the damage parameter is sufficiently small.