考虑排污权交易的有限理性企业博弈模型研究

在有限理性基础上建立寡头垄断博弈模型,将其引入到排污权市场中,同时考虑了生产成本、污染治理成本、排污权交易价格的影响,使该模型更符合实际。将不同理性层次,不同结构的非线性成本函数,不完全信息等因素引入到博弈模型中,对改进后的模型的演化过程进行分析,找出博弈均衡点,并分析其稳定性。由于具有有限理性的双寡头Cournot博弈模型会产生丰富的动力学行为,因此对其进行数据模拟后并对混沌现象进行分析。在此基础上,运用延迟反馈控制法对寡头垄断博弈模型的混沌控制进行了解析分析,结果表明选择合适的控制因子可使模型稳定在Nash均衡。

Study on a Game Model with Bounded Rationality Enterprise of Emissions Trading

Based on the bounded rationality establish a duopoly game model, considering the effect of production cost, pollution control cost, emissions trading price, and then applying it to the emissions market, make the model more practical to the market. The game model is built to analyze the evolution process of the improved model with different rational levels, different structure of the nonlinear cost function ,and incomplete information, find out the equilibrium game theory, and analyzes its stability. Because of bounded rationality cournot duopoly game model have a wealth of dynamic behavior, so we carry on the data simulation and analysis of chaos phenomena. On this basis, chaotic control of the duopoly game model analyzed delayed feedback control method; analysis indicate that Nash equilibrium enable to maintainable if suitable control parameter is chosen.