上市公司高层管理人员监控的有效性研究

政府作为国有企业的出资人和国有产权的代理人,将政府机构控股转移到国有企业控股,并通过法规和准则来加强公司治理,以此来提高对上市公司监控的有效性。由此,使用公司业绩作为上述2项措施发挥监控作用的替代变量,实证分析其对上市公司监控的有效性。研究结果表明,国有企业控股公司比政府机构控股公司更能监控高层管理人员;同时,高层管理人员的变更对公司业绩有较高的敏感性,但公司治理机制并没有对公司高层管理人员变更与公司业绩的敏感性产生重大影响。在我国,上市公司由于业绩欠佳而更换高层管管理人员时,对控股股东的激励比公司治理机制更重要。

Effective Monitoring of Senior Management in Listed Companies

Effective monitoring of the senior management of listed companies is one of the important issues of human resource management.Effective monitoring the senior executives of listed companies helps to improve the efficiency of the company’s operations.Government agencies are the investors of the state-owned enterprises and the agent of state-owned property.Transferring to state-owned enterprises holding and strengthening corporate governance via regulations and guidelines improves the effectiveness of the monitoring in listed companies.As a result,the performance of the company plays a monitoring role of proxy variables as the above two measures,and this paper makes the empirical analysis of the effectiveness of its monitoring in listed companies.Studies have shown that government share-holding is a better for effective monitoring the senior executives and corporate performance is sensitive to change of top management.When changing top management for bad performance,motivation of share-holders is more important than corporate government mechanisms.