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计及网络约束的激励性电力市场竞价机制设计
引用本文:杨光,俞集辉,张谦,杨越,何健.计及网络约束的激励性电力市场竞价机制设计[J].电网技术,2009,33(9).
作者姓名:杨光  俞集辉  张谦  杨越  何健
作者单位:输配电装备及系统安全与新技术国家重点实验室(重庆大学)重庆市,沙坪坝区,400030  
摘    要:根据机制设计理论,设计了一种具有激励相容特性的电力竞价机制.该机制考虑了网络约束的影响,解决了在实际应用时难以计算的问题,并能有效地激励发电商上报真实成本,实现社会资源的合理配置.文章以IEEE-14节点列络为算例进行仿真分析,结果表明该机制可抑制发电商的市场力,节约购电成本,稳定电价,有利于实现社会资源的优化配置.

关 键 词:机制设计理论  显示原理  激励相容  信息补偿

Design of Incentive Bidding Mechanism on Electricity Market With Network Constraints Considered
YANG Guang,YU Ji-hui,ZHANG Qian,YANG Yue,HE Jian.Design of Incentive Bidding Mechanism on Electricity Market With Network Constraints Considered[J].Power System Technology,2009,33(9).
Authors:YANG Guang  YU Ji-hui  ZHANG Qian  YANG Yue  HE Jian
Abstract:According to mechanism design theory, a power bidding mechanism existing incentive and compatibility features is designed. The designed mechanism considers the influence of network constraints, solves the problems which are hard to be calculated in practical application, and can motivate the power plants reporting their true costs to upper department to realize reasonable allocation of social resources. Taking IEEE 14-bus system for calculation example, the designed bidding mechanism is simulated. Simulatio...
Keywords:mechanism design theory  revelation principle  incentive compatibility  information compensation  
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