过度自信委托代理人间的薪酬合同研究

委托-代理模型中，委托人委托代理人销售产品并付给代理人一定的报酬. 委托人和代理人对随机需求的均值或方差的估计存在误差，由此产生绝对过度自信和相对过度自信. 委托人可提供的薪酬合同有两种：线性合同和阈值合同. 在委托人和代理人持有的不同自信度组合中，分别给出了线性合同和阈值合同下的最优参数. 研究得出：对委托人而言，当且仅当其关于不确定性需求方差的信念较代理人悲观，并且对市场需求位于零点附近的可能性的估计较代理人小时，阈值合同优于线性合同；否则，在线性合同和阈值合同下，委托人的均衡期望收益相等.

Study on principal-agent salary contracts based on the members’overconfidence

In a principal-agent model, the agent sales the principal's products and gets his salary. The principle and the agent knowingly hold different beliefs regarding the mean and (or) the variance of the distribution of the stochastic demand, which raises the absolute overconfidence and relative overconfidence between the two members. The principle can design two forms of contracts: a linear contract and a threshold contract. All the optimal decisions in the two forms of contracts under different combinations of the two members' overconfidence are obtained. We find that the threshold contract is better than the linear contract from the perspective of the principal if and only if the principle is more pessimistic than the agent with respect to the estimation of demand variance and his estimation of the probability of demand fall into the region near the zero point is less than that from the point of the agent, thus the principle could improve his expected profit by adopting the threshold contract; otherwise, the principal's equilibrium expected profits under the two forms of contract are the same, which means the threshold contract is equivalent to the linear contract from the perspective of the principal.