| 不完全信息下电力市场竞价的博弈模型 |
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| 引用本文： | 丁乐群,黎永亮,潘忠志.不完全信息下电力市场竞价的博弈模型[J].哈尔滨建筑大学学报,2003(11). |
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| 作者姓名： | 丁乐群 黎永亮 潘忠志 |
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| 作者单位： | 东北电力学院管理工程系，哈尔滨工业大学管理学院，东北电力学院管理工程系 吉林 吉林 132012，黑龙江 哈尔滨 150001，吉林 吉林 132012 |
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| 摘 要： | 针对在单一购买者的电力市场模式下发电商之间的竞争,在研究了不完全信息条件下电力联营体的最优拍卖机制基础上,将发电商的生产成本或生产函数看作是其私人信息,通过应用博弈论中关于机制设计的理论,建立了电力联营体最优拍卖机制的理论模型.用该模型求出的交易机制可为电力监管部门在进行发电市场的信息引导时提供理论依据.
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| 关 键 词： | 不完全信息 博弈论 电力市场 交易机制 |
Selection of bidding mechanism with incomplete information |
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| DING Le-qun LI Yong-liang PAN Zhong-zhi.Selection of bidding mechanism with incomplete information[J].Journal of Harbin University of Civil Engineering and Architecture,2003(11). |
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| Authors: | DING Le-qun LI Yong-liang PAN Zhong-zhi |
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| Affiliation: | DING Le-qun~1 LI Yong-liang~2 PAN Zhong-zhi~1 |
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| Abstract: | Under the market model of one-buyer,the competitions between generators are realized through their biddings to power net buyer.The optimal bidding mechanism in a power pool with incomplete information is studied.A generator's production cost or production function is considered to be its private information. Through applying the revelation principle of Bayesian game,the theoretical model of optimal mechanism for a power pool is deduced and set up.The result of this model can be used as a rule in steering the power genera- tion market with information. |
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| Keywords: | imperfect information game theory electric power market transaction mechanism |
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