The 1986 U.K. Insolvency and Company Directors' Disqualification Acts: An evaluation of their impacts upon small firm financing decisions

This paper examines the potential impact of the 1986 U.K. Insolvency and Company Directors' Disqualification Acts on small firm financing decisions. With the aid of a simplified Black and Scholes (1973) option model of financing decisions, the paper illustrates how the 1986 legislation reduces the incentives for owner-managers to gamble with creditor claims, particularly in situations of financial distress, by making them personally liable for unmet claims and/or by disqualifying them from holding office for a fixed period. For instance, example 3 in the paper shows the conflict that could result from the owner-manager reducing his/her opening equity position and it further argues how the legislation should act to alleviate the situation. It remains, however, an empirical question as to whether this reduction in creditors' exposure to the risk of uncompensated wealth transfers will ultimately result in a significantly greater number of company liquidations and disqualifications, particularly during a prolonged economic downturn, or an improved/less costly supply of finance to small firms.