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基于政府间博弈的农村饮水安全工程补偿分摊模型
引用本文:黄大卫,吕周洋,丰景春.基于政府间博弈的农村饮水安全工程补偿分摊模型[J].水电能源科学,2017,35(1):153-155.
作者姓名:黄大卫  吕周洋  丰景春
作者单位:河海大学 a. 商学院; b. “世界水谷”与水生态文明协同创新中心; c. 项目管理研究所, 江苏 南京 210098
基金项目:2014年度国家社科基金重点项目(14AZD024);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(2013/B14020090);中国博士后科学基金项目(2014M551498);贵州省水利厅科技专项经费资助项目(KT201321);广西水利厅科技项目(201224)
摘    要:针对农村饮水安全工程补偿中产生的基层政府与省级政府虚报及确定各级政府间的补偿分摊比例等问题,就资金申报问题建立了中央与地方政府的监管博弈模型来监督地方政府的虚报,并构建了分摊比例模型来确定各级政府的分摊比例。将该模型应用于江苏某农村饮用水工程中,模型计算结果符合各博弈主体的利益。研究成果为中央及省级政府参与项目分摊提供了理论依据。

关 键 词:农村饮水安全工程    分摊补偿    博弈    运行机制

Compensation Allocation Model for Rural Drinking Water Safety Issue Based on the Game between Governments
Abstract:False money problem between the basic level government and the provincial government and compensation allocation proportion issue among all levels of governments are two major concerns in the compensation of rural drinking water safety project. To solve the first issue, the game model of the regulation of the central government and local government funds declaration is built. And for the second issue, an allocation proportion model is set up. By using the two models in a rural drinking water safety project of Jiangsu Province, it shows that the model results accord with the interests of all the game players. The research results provide a theoretical basis for the central and provincial government in participating the allocation of a project.
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