Role of impulsivity in the relationship between depression and alcohol problems among emerging adult college drinkers.

Depression is common among college students and higher levels of depression are associated with greater alcohol-related problems. However, depression is frequently not found to be directly associated with more alcohol use. This study examined whether various aspects of impulsivity (negative urgency, lack of premeditation, lack of perseverance, sensation seeking, and delay discounting) and drinking to cope with negative affect help to account for the relationship between depression and alcohol problems among emerging adult college drinkers who reported at least a minimal level of depressive symptoms. In this cross-sectional study, 143 emerging adult (between 18 and 25 years old) female (69.9%, n = 100) and male (30.1%, n = 43) college drinkers with at least minimal depressive symptoms completed measures of depression, alcohol use and problems, drinking to cope, and impulsivity. A multiple mediation analysis revealed that only negative urgency and drinking to cope partially mediated the depression-alcohol problems relationship. Moderated mediation analyses revealed that impulsivity-related constructs did not significantly interact with drinking to cope to increase alcohol problems. It appears that alcohol use is particularly problematic for students with elevated depression, and this is partly attributable to depression's association with negative urgency, in addition to its association with drinking to cope. Our findings suggest that students who suffer from depression may engage in problematic drinking behavior in part because negative affect is detrimental to their short-term impulse control and decision making, independent of maladaptive attempts to regulate affect through drinking to cope. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Discounting future green: Money versus the environment.

In 3 studies, participants made choices between hypothetical financial, environmental, and health gains and losses that took effect either immediately or with a delay of 1 or 10 years. In all 3 domains, choices indicated that gains were discounted more than losses. There were no significant differences in the discounting of monetary and environmental outcomes, but health gains were discounted more and health losses were discounted less than gains or losses in the other 2 domains. Correlations between implicit discount rates for these different choices suggest that discount rates are influenced more by the valence of outcomes (gains vs. losses) than by domain (money, environment, or health). Overall, results indicate that when controlling as many factors as possible, at short to medium delays, environmental outcomes are discounted in a similar way to financial outcomes, which is good news for researchers and policy makers alike. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Novel models of intertemporal valuation: Past and future outcomes.

Temporal discounting refers to the reduction in the present subjective value of an outcome as a function of the temporal distance to that outcome. Though a number of mathematical models have been proposed to describe this time/value relationship, this search has largely excluded insights from the literature on memory decay. This study examines the utility of memory decay models by comparing the fits of 4 of these models to fits from established temporal discounting models using past and future temporal discounting data. These results (a) suggest that a single model describes valuation of both future and past outcomes; (b) indicate the exponential-power model, from memory decay literature, is statistically superior in fitting discounting data from both past and future outcomes; and (c) support the advancing perspective of the psychological interconnectedness of the future and past. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Differential effects on effort discounting induced by inactivations of the nucleus accumbens core or shell.

The authors investigated the contribution of the nucleus accumbens (NAc) core and shell to effort-based decision making using a discounting procedure. Selection of 1 lever delivered a smaller, 2-pellet reward immediately, whereas the other lever delivered a 4-pellet reward after a fixed ratio of presses (2, 5, 10, or 20) that increased over 4 blocks of 10 discrete choice trials. Subsequent testing employed an equivalent delays procedure, whereby the relative delay to reward delivery after selection of either option was equalized. In well-trained rats, inactivation of the core, but not the shell, via infusion of GABA A/B agonists muscimol/baclofen reduced preference for the high-effort option under standard conditions and also when rats were tested using an equivalent delays procedure. However, inactivation of the core did not alter preference for 4-pellet versus 2-pellet rewards when the relative costs of each option were the same (1 press). Thus, the NAc core, but not the shell, appears to be part of a neural circuit that biases choice toward larger rewards associated with a greater effort cost. Furthermore, the contributions by the NAc core to this form of decision making can be dissociated from its role in delay discounting. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Now or later? Striatum and insula activation to immediate versus delayed rewards.

Neuroimaging studies on delay discounting tasks that use reward delays ranging from minutes to days have implicated the insula and striatum in the processing of intertemporal decisions. This study aimed at assessing whether these brain regions would also be involved in decision-making when subjects have to wait through the delays within the range of seconds. Using functional MRI in 13 healthy volunteers, we repeatedly presented monetary options with delays that differed within the range of multiple seconds. Using a region-of-interest approach, we found significant activation in the bilateral anterior insula and striatum when subjects chose either the immediate (smaller) or delayed (larger) option. In particular, insular activation was observed after the response and the delay, when the outcome of the immediate or the delayed choice was shown. Significantly greater activation was observed in the ventroanterior striatum while subjects chose the immediate, as opposed to the delayed, options and also after receiving the outcome of waiting through the longer delay option. The evidence presented here indicates that both the ventral striatum and the insula are involved in the processing of choosing delay options as well as the consequences of choices with delays in the seconds' range. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The short of it: Abbreviating the temporal discounting procedure.

A typical temporal discounting procedure determines the present, subjective value (indifference point) of a delayed outcome at 5 to 8 different delays to that outcome. These indifference points are used to determine a single index of discounting called a discounting rate. One concern that remains in the collection of this data is the high number of trials or choices, resulting in participant fatigue or other factors that may affect the validity of the data. In this report, we propose an abbreviated alternative to the more comprehensive and time-consuming discounting procedure. Specifically, we propose that fewer indifference points can be used to determine statistically equivalent discount rates with no loss in data sensitivity. We reanalyzed temporal discounting data obtained with 7 indifference points, and estimated discount rates from all combinations of 2, 3, and 4 of the 7 indifference points. Results indicate that valid and sensitive discounting indices can be obtained with fewer indifference points, and the most appropriate sets of indifference points are highlighted. The proposed abbreviated procedure is likely to be particularly useful when time constraints or participant fatigue is a concern as well as in repeated-measures contexts. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Temporal discounting of rewards in patients with bipolar disorder and schizophrenia.

Patients with bipolar disorder (BD) and schizophrenia (SZ) often show decision-making deficits in everyday circumstances. A failure to appropriately weigh immediate versus future consequences of choices may contribute to these deficits. We used the delay discounting task in individuals with BD or SZ to investigate their temporal decision making. Twenty-two individuals with BD, 21 individuals with SZ, and 30 healthy individuals completed the delay discounting task along with neuropsychological measures of working memory and cognitive function. Both BD and SZ groups discounted delayed rewards more steeply than did the healthy group even after controlling for current substance use, age, gender, and employment. Hierarchical multiple regression analyses showed that discounting rate was associated with both diagnostic group and working memory or intelligence scores. In each group, working memory or intelligence scores negatively correlated with discounting rate. The results suggest that (a) both BD and SZ groups value smaller, immediate rewards more than larger, delayed rewards compared with the healthy group and (b) working memory or intelligence is related to temporal decision making in individuals with BD or SZ as well as in healthy individuals. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Temporal horizons in decision making.

The perception of duration is crucial when we make choices between immediate and delayed rewards. Immediate rewards are valued more than the same rewards if they are delayed. Preferences for earlier rewards become even stronger when the reward can be received within a subjectively proximate time frame. A “rational” decision to wait for a delayed reward may be overruled by an “impulsive” choice when the option for the closer reward falls within this proximate time range. Based on findings on circadian and circannual physiological rhythms, we suggest that there are 2 time units that are both biologically and culturally determined and have an impact on human experience and behavior: the day and the year. We highlight results of a neuroimaging study showing that rewards with delays up to 1 year are discounted differently than reward delays longer than 1 year. This duration-dependent discounting is associated with specific brain activation in the striatum. We present various conceptualizations of subjective time incorporated in parametric models of intertemporal decisions that may lead to a better understanding of human choice behavior. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)