The value of being precise

This study investigates how individuals assess imprecise information. We focus on two essential dimensions of decision under uncertainty, outcomes and probabilities, and their respective precision. We believe the precision of information is highly relevant in the investment setting, as reflected in the well-known “home (familiarity) bias”, and the outcome and probability dimensions, separately or jointly, may affect investors’ knowledge of uncertainty and perceived risk of the investment options, and subsequently affect investors’ choices. To test this conjecture, we conducted three experiments. Our results show that 1) participants demonstrate a pattern of preference for precision and aversion of extreme vagueness and associate vagueness with higher perceived risk and lower investment (experiments one and two); 2) participants prefer vague outcome information to vague probability information (experiment two); 3) familiarity indeed positively affects the precision of estimated values, but this association is stronger for the outcome dimension than for probabilities (experiment three). Our results confirm that precision in information, especially in the outcome dimension has an impact on investors’ resource allocation choices.     

An Empirical Model of Perceived Mortality Risks for Selected U.S. Arsenic Hot Spots

Researchers have long recognized that subjective perceptions of risk are better predictors of choices over risky outcomes than science‐based or experts’ assessments of risk. More recent work suggests that uncertainty about risks also plays a role in predicting choices and behavior. In this article, we develop and estimate a formal model for an individual's perceived health risks associated with arsenic contamination of his or her drinking water. The modeling approach treats risk as a random variable, with an estimable probability distribution whose variance reflects uncertainty. The model we estimate uses data collected from a survey given to a sample of people living in arsenic‐prone areas in the United States. The findings from this article support the fact that scientific information is essential to explaining the mortality rate perceived by the individuals, but uncertainty about the probability remains significant.     

Eliciting decision weights by adapting de Finetti’s betting-odds method to prospect theory

This paper extends de Finetti’s betting-odds method for assessing subjective beliefs to ambiguous events. Thus, a tractable manner for measuring decision weights under ambiguity is obtained. De Finetti’s method is so transparent that decision makers can evaluate the relevant tradeoffs in complex situations. The resulting data can easily be analyzed, using nonparametric techniques. Our extension is implemented in an experiment on predicting next-day’s performance of the Dow Jones and Nikkei stock indexes, where we test the existence and nature of rank dependence, finding usual patterns. We also find violations of rank dependence.

Hopes and Fears: the Conflicting Effects of Risk Ambiguity

The Ellsberg Paradox documented the aversion to ambiguity in the probability of winning a prize. Using an original sample of 266 business owners and managers facing risks from climate change, this paper documents the presence of departures from rationality in both directions. Both ambiguity-seeking behavior and ambiguity-averse behavior are evident. People exhibit fear effects of ambiguity for small probabilities of suffering a loss and hope effects for large probabilities. Estimates of the crossover point from ambiguity aversion (fear) to ambiguity seeking (hope) place this value between 0.3 and 0.7 for the risk per decade lotteries considered, with empirical estimates indicating a crossover mean risk of about 0.5. Attitudes toward the degree of ambiguity also reverse at the crossover point.     

Choices at various levels of uncertainty: An experimental test of the restated diversification theorem

Our “Restated diversification theorem” (Skogh and Wu, 2005) says that risk-averse agents may pool risks efficiently without assignment of subjective probabilities to outcomes, also at genuine uncertainty. It suffices that the agents presume that they face equal risks. Here, the theorem is tested in an experiment where the probability of loss, and the information about this probability, varies. The result supports our theorem. Moreover, it tentatively supports an evolutionary theory of the insurance industry—starting with mutual pooling at uncertainty, turning into insurance priced ex ante when actuarial information is available.     

Understanding the Risk of an Avian Flu Pandemic: Rational Waiting or Precautionary Failure?

The precautionary principle (PP) has been proposed as the proper guide for the decision-making criteria to be adopted in the face of the new catastrophic risks that have arisen in the last decades. This article puts forward a workable definition of the PP based on the so-called alpha-maximin expected utility approach, applying it to the possible outbreak of the avian flu disease among humans. Moreover, it shows how the shortage and/or lack of effective drugs against the infection of the virus A(H5N1) among humans can be considered a precautionary failure.     

A Paradox for the “Smooth Ambiguity” Model of Preference

Two Ellsberg‐style thought experiments are described that reflect on the smooth ambiguity decision model developed by Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005). The first experiment poses difficulties for the model's axiomatic foundations and, as a result, also for its interpretation, particularly for the claim that the model achieves a separation between ambiguity and the attitude toward ambiguity. Given the problematic nature of its foundations, the behavioral content of the model and how it differs from multiple priors, for example, are not clear. The second thought experiment casts some light on these questions.     

Subjective Probabilities on Subjectively Unambiguous Events

This paper suggests a behavioral definition of (subjective) ambiguity in an abstract setting where objects of choice are Savage‐style acts. Then axioms are described that deliver probabilistic sophistication of preference on the set of unambiguous acts. In particular, both the domain and the values of the decision‐maker's probability measure are derived from preference. It is argued that the noted result also provides a decision‐theoretic foundation for the Knightian distinction between risk and ambiguity.     

Pre-decisional information acquisition: Why do we pay too much for information? Brief report

People tend to acquire more information while making their decisions than a rational and risk-neutral benchmark would predict. We conduct a carefully designed experiment to derive five plausible reasons for pre-decision information overpurchasing. The results show that overpurchasing of information can be almost entirely explained by systematic information processing errors (misestimation or incorrect Bayesian updating), possibly caused by biased intuitive decision processes. Other factors, such as overoptimism about the validity of the new information, risk aversion, ambiguity aversion, and curiosity about (irrelevant) information, play at most a minor role. Our results imply that information overacquisitions are mainly driven by the overestimation of the usefulness of additional information.     

Causes of ambiguity aversion: Known versus unknown preferences

Ambiguity aversion appears to have subtle psychological causes. Curley, Yates, and Abrams found that the fear of negative evaluation by others (FNE) increases ambiguity aversion. This paper introduces a design in which preferences can be private information of individuals, so that FNE can be avoided entirely. Thus, we can completely control for FNE and other social factors, and can determine exactly to what extent ambiguity aversion is driven by such social factors. In our experiment ambiguity aversion, while appearing as commonly found in the presence of FNE, disappears entirely if FNE is eliminated. Implications are discussed.