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We study the possibility of cartel formation among primary exporters who face an inelastic world demand for their exports. The phenomenon of immiserizing export growth appears as a non-cooperative equilibrium in a two-country export game. With infinite repetitions of the one shot game, we show that `different country size' will be detrimental to the sustenance of the collusive behavior needed for eliminating the possibility of immiserization. 相似文献
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This study examines the role of intellectual property rights (IPRs) in contractual research and development (R&D) in developing countries. We find that strong IPRs provide incentives for firms, both multinational and local, to specialize in R&D activities in which they have competitive advantage (the specialization effect). They also facilitate the switching process from imitators to potential innovators for local firms (the switching effect). Moreover, we also demonstrate that a multinational firm's strategic IPRs enforcement behavior can be an effective instrument for subsidizing contractual R&D in developing countries (the subsidizing effect). We further illustrate how a policy mix of IPRs and a foreign direct investment subsidy in these countries affects R&D activities by adding an offshore R&D subsidiary as an additional organizational form. (JEL L13, O31, O34) 相似文献
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Trade and Wage Inequality in Developing Countries 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
In this article we provide a theoretical analysis of the possible impact of trade and fragmentation on the skilled–unskilled wage gap in a small developing economy. In particular, we illustrate the possibility of a decline in the relative wage of the unskilled labor following an improvement in the terms of trade. (JEL F1 , F11 , F12 ) 相似文献
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