New Zealand lawyers and conveyancers disciplinary tribunal cases involving vulnerable clients, 2011–2017*

ABSTRACT

This research analyses disciplinary decisions of the New Zealand Lawyers and Conveyancers Disciplinary Tribunal (NZLCDT) from 2011 to 2017 that involve vulnerable clients. Increasingly, scholarship discusses vulnerability as an ethical concept, including in the legal context. Based on published decisions, the present study inquires whether some legal clients’ vulnerability warrants special attention. Twenty-five of the 193 clients in the NZLCDT decisions qualified as vulnerable based upon age, gender, mental health/neuro-disability or immigrant status. The results may inform disciplinary bodies and inspire preventive strategies by lawyers, educators and regulatory bodies. Ultimately, this evidence-based analysis magnifies the importance of client-centred approaches to risk reduction in legal practice.     

Lost on the Way Home? The Right to Life in Northern Ireland

This article starts from the premise that, through the Belfast Agreement, the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) was invested with a 'transitional justice' function in Northern Ireland, unlike in the rest of the United Kingdom. The article evaluates how far the HRA has met this challenge by examining a case study of the right to life. The European Court's development of a procedural aspect to the right to life in the form of a right to an effective investigation, has implicated both institutional reform for the future, and also a need to revisit past state killings with their 'transitional justice' implications. There have been some positive developments, but, despite this, domestic institutions and courts have largely failed to deliver on Article 2's procedural aspect. The article concludes by questioning whether the very design of the HRA has limited the possibilities for a 'transformational constitutionalism' capable of incorporating Article 2's procedural right.     

Liberal Equality, Exploitation, and the Case for an Unconditional Basic Income

This paper considers whether arguments presented in Philippe Van Parijs' Real Freedom for All: What (if Anything) Can Justify Capitalism? succeed in rebutting the objection that the introduction of a substantial unconditional basic income (UBI) would allow non-working citizens to free-ride on the efforts of, and so exploit, working citizens. It considers Van Parjis' 'external assets argument' for UBI, and finds that this argument does not succeed in reconciling payment of a substantial UBI with the reciprocity principle which underpins this 'exploitation objection'. It considers and rejects Van Parijs' implicit claim that the exploitation objection must be grounded in a distributive principle which contradicts the egalitarian commitment to prevent brute luck inequality. It concludes that Van Parjis has failed, thus far, to articulate a convincing response to the exploitation objection.