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**排序方式：**共有540条查询结果，搜索用时 31 毫秒

1.

南水北调中线水量分配准市场模型研究

**总被引：3，自引：2，他引：1**现重点探讨了在准市场情况下南水北调中线水量分配的理论和模型,在比较计划分配与市场分配的基础上,从理论上说明中线建立准市场水量分配的必要性和可行性。结合政府宏观调控和水市场机制两种配置方式的优势和中线水量调度自身特点,建立了中线准市场水量分配模型。通过求解非线性最优化方程,研究了模型求解思路和方法,证明求得的解是Nash均衡解。最后阐述了准市场模型对中线水量调度的理论意义和应用价值。 相似文献

2.

发电商不同策略的供应函数均衡分析

**总被引：5，自引：1，他引：4**电力市场是一个接近寡头垄断的市场,因而市场中的发电商往往会采用策略性投标来获得最大收益.根据联营模式下电力市场的特点,利用供应函数模型来模拟发电商的策略行为,给出了各发电商选择改变不同投标参数报价时的反应函数,通过算例比较研究了多个发电商在改变不同投标参数报价时的纳什均衡策略,结果表明选择改变不同投标参数报价会影响均衡结果.此外,还分析了需求弹性等因素对发电商均衡策略的影响. 相似文献

3.

Two

*minimal*requirements for a satisfactory multiagent learning algorithm are that it 1. learns to play optimally against stationary opponents and 2. converges to a Nash equilibrium in self-play. The previous algorithm that has come closest, WoLF-IGA, has been proven to have these two properties in 2-player 2-action (repeated) games—assuming that the opponent’s mixed strategy is observable. Another algorithm, ReDVaLeR (which was introduced after the algorithm described in this paper), achieves the two properties in games with arbitrary numbers of actions and players, but still requires that the opponents' mixed strategies are observable. In this paper we present AWESOME, the first algorithm that is guaranteed to have the two properties in games with arbitrary numbers of actions and players. It is still the only algorithm that does so while only relying on observing the other players' actual actions (not their mixed strategies). It also learns to play optimally against opponents that*eventually become*stationary. The basic idea behind AWESOME (*Adapt When Everybody is Stationary, Otherwise Move to Equilibrium*) is to try to adapt to the others' strategies when they appear stationary, but otherwise to retreat to a precomputed equilibrium strategy. We provide experimental results that suggest that AWESOME converges fast in practice. The techniques used to prove the properties of AWESOME are fundamentally different from those used for previous algorithms, and may help in analyzing future multiagent learning algorithms as well.**Editors:**Amy Greenwald and Michael Littman 相似文献4.

基于粒子群算法的发电商非合作博弈行为分析

**总被引：1，自引：1，他引：0**电力市场环境下，发电商竞价策略对自身获利有很大影响，为使自身获利最大化，须对竞价策略进行研究。利用博弈论方法对电力市场中电力总需求缺乏弹性时各发电商间非合作关系下竞价上网的报价行为进行了分析研究，并用粒子群算法(Particle Swarm Optimizer，PSO)求出了纳什均衡的近似解。该解可以指导发电商制定竞价上网的报价曲线，避免发电商盲目报价。本研究为考虑时间约束后纳什均衡解的求取提供了思路和方法。 相似文献

5.

Based on the basis of the two-stage dynamic game of complete information and purely tactful perfect equilibrium theory, the non-cooperative gaming between the police department and the criminals is analyzed. Dy-namic game can be proved to forecast and explain potential tactful choices of the police department and the crimi-nals at various stages, so as to analyze the essence of the law enforcement by the theoretical models. 相似文献

6.

Stephan Eidenbenz V. S. Anil Kumar Sibylle Zust 《Mobile Networks and Applications》2006,11(2):143-159

We study topology control problems in ad hoc networks where network nodes get to choose their power levels in order to ensure
desired connectivity properties. Unlike most other work on this topic, we assume that the network nodes are owned by different
entities, whose only goal is to maximize their own utility that they get out of the network without considering the overall
performance of the network. Game theory is the appropriate tool to study such selfish nodes: we define several topology control
games in which the nodes need to choose power levels in order to connect to other nodes in the network to reach their communication
partners while at the same time minimizing their costs. We study Nash equilibria and show that—among the games we define—these
can only be guaranteed to exist if each network node is required to be connected to all other nodes (we call this the Strong Connectivity Game). For a variation called Connectivity Game, where each node is only required to be connected (possibly via intermediate nodes) to a given set of nodes, we show that
Nash equilibria do not necessarily exist. We further study how to find Nash equilibria with

*incentive-compatible*algorithms and compare the cost of Nash equilibria to the cost of a social optimum, which is a radius assignment that minimizes the total cost in a network where nodes cooperate. We also study variations of the games; one where nodes not only have to be connected, but*k-connected*, and one that we call the Reachability Game, where nodes have to reach as many other nodes as possible, while keeping costs low. We extend our study of the Strong Connectivity Game and the Connectivity Game to wireless networks with directional antennas and wireline networks, where nodes need to choose neighbors to which they will pay a link. Our work is a first step towards game-theoretic analyses of topology control in wireless and wireline networks. A preliminary version of this paper appeared in DIALM-POMC ’03 [8].**Stephan Eidenbenz**is a technical staff member in Discrete Simulation Sciences (CCS-5) at Los Alamos National Laboraotry. He received his Ph.D. in Computer Science from the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Zurich, Switzerland in 2000. Stephan’s research covers areas in approximability, algorithms, computational geometry, computational biology, large-scale discrete simulation, selfish networking, efficient networking, protocol design and optimization.**V. S. Anil Kumar**is currently an Assistant Professor in the Dept. of Computer Science and a Senior Research Associate at Virginia Bioinformatics Institute, Virginia Tech. Prior to this, he was a technical staff member in Los Alamos National Laboratory. He received a Ph.D. in Computer Science from the Indian Institute of Science in 1999. His research interests include approximation algorithms, mobile computing, combinatorial optimization and simulation of large socio-technical systems.**Sibylle Zust**received her Masters degree in mathematics from ETH Zurich in Switzerland in 2002. She wrote her diploma thesis at the University of Copenhagen in Denmark. Sibylle Zust spent two and a half years (2002–2005) as a graduate research assistant at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico, USA, where she worked on algorithmic aspects of game theory and scheduling problems. She now works for an insurance company in Zurich, Switzerland. 相似文献7.

The design of dynamic Label-Switched Paths (LSP’s) in MultiProtocol Label Switched (MPLS) networks is an NP-hard optimization
problem. An LSP is a logical path between two nodes in the network. This path has a pre-reserved amount of bandwidth that
defines its size. The LSP design problem consists of determining the number of these logical links and configuring the physical
path and the size of each LSP. This paper presents an optimization model based on game theory. In this approach, connection
requests are modeled as competitive players in a noncooperative game context. The transport network bandwidth constitutes
the resource for which optimization is sought. The outcome of this optimization is a set of LSPs upon which the competing
connections are routed. 相似文献

8.

A study of convergence in decentralized design processes

**总被引：1，自引：1，他引：0**The decomposition and coordination of decisions in the design of complex engineering systems is a great challenge. Companies
who design these systems routinely allocate design responsibility of the various subsystems and components to different people,
teams or even suppliers. The mechanisms behind this network of decentralized design decisions create difficult management
and coordination issues. However, developing efficient design processes is paramount, especially with market pressures and
customer expectations. Standard techniques to modeling and solving decentralized design problems typically fail to understand
the underlying dynamics of the decentralized processes and therefore result in suboptimal solutions. This paper aims to model
and understand the mechanisms and dynamics behind a decentralized set of decisions within a complex design process. By using
concepts from the fields of mathematics and economics, including Game Theory and the Cobweb model, we model a simple decentralized
design problem and provide efficient solutions. This new approach uses matrix series and linear algebra as tools to determine
conditions for convergence of such decentralized design problems. The goal of this paper is to establish the first steps towards
understanding the mechanisms of decentralized decision processes. This includes two major steps: studying the convergence
characteristics and finding the final equilibrium solution of a decentralized problem. Illustrations of the developments are
provided in the form of two decentralized design problems with different underlying behavior. 相似文献

9.

S. E. Bukhtoyarov V. A. Emelichev Yu. V. Stepanishina 《Cybernetics and Systems Analysis》2003,39(4):604-614

The paper presents a survey of analysis of different types of stability in vector (multiple-criteria) combinatorial problem with the parametrized optimality principle. Formulas of stability sphere radius are given along with qualitative characteristics of stability. 相似文献

10.

Thorsten Clausing 《Journal of Logic, Language and Information》2002,11(3):335-348

In this paper, I develop a syntactic framework for the analysis ofstrategic form games that is based on a straightforward combination ofstandard systems of doxastic, probabilistic and conditionalpropositional logic. In particular, for the probabilistic part I makeuse of the axiomatization provided in Fagin and Halpern (1994). The use ofconditionals allows to represent a strategic form game by a logicalformula in a very natural way. Also expected utility maximization can benaturally captured. I use this framework to prove a version of a resulton Nash equilibrium conjectures first presented in Aumann and Brandenburger (1995). 相似文献